

CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL EXAMINATIONS

GCE Advanced Subsidiary Level and GCE Advanced Level

MARK SCHEME for the October/November 2013 series

9697 HISTORY

9697/31

Paper 3, maximum raw mark 100

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes should be read in conjunction with the question paper and the Principal Examiner Report for Teachers.

Cambridge will not enter into discussions about these mark schemes.

Cambridge is publishing the mark schemes for the October/November 2013 series for most IGCSE, GCE Advanced Level and Advanced Subsidiary Level components and some Ordinary Level components.

Page 2	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE A LEVEL – October/November 2013	9697	31

GENERIC MARK BANDS FOR ESSAY QUESTIONS

Examiners will assess which Level of Response best reflects most of the answer. An answer will not be required to demonstrate all of the descriptions in a particular Level to qualify for a Mark Band.

Band	Marks	Levels of Response
1	21–25	<i>The approach will be consistently analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. Essays will be fully relevant. The argument will be structured coherently and supported by very appropriate factual material and ideas. The writing will be accurate. At the lower end of the band, there may be some weaker sections but the overall quality will show that the candidate is in control of the argument.</i>
2	18–20	<i>Essays will be focused clearly on the demands of the question but there will be some unevenness. The approach will be mostly analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. The answer will be mostly relevant. Most of the argument will be structured coherently and supported by largely accurate factual material. The impression will be that a good solid answer has been provided.</i>
3	16–17	<i>Essays will reflect a clear understanding of the question and a fair attempt to provide an argument and factual knowledge to answer it. The approach will contain analysis or explanation but there may be some heavily descriptive or narrative passages. The answer will be largely relevant. Essays will achieve a genuine argument but may lack balance and depth in factual knowledge. Most of the answer will be structured satisfactorily but some parts may lack full coherence.</i>
4	14–15	<i>Essays will indicate attempts to argue relevantly although often implicitly. The approach will depend more on some heavily descriptive or narrative passages than on analysis or explanation, which may be limited to introductions and conclusions. Factual material, sometimes very full, will be used to impart information or describe events rather than to address directly the requirements of the question. The structure of the argument could be organised more effectively.</i>
5	11–13	<i>Essays will offer some appropriate elements but there will be little attempt generally to link factual material to the requirements of the question. The approach will lack analysis and the quality of the description or narrative, although sufficiently accurate and relevant to the topic if not the particular question, will not be linked effectively to the argument. The structure will show weaknesses and the treatment of topics within the answer will be unbalanced.</i>
6	8–10	<i>Essays will not be properly focused on the requirements of the question. There may be many unsupported assertions and commentaries that lack sufficient factual support. The argument may be of limited relevance to the topic and there may be confusion about the implications of the question.</i>
7	0–7	<i>Essays will be characterised by significant irrelevance or arguments that do not begin to make significant points. The answers may be largely fragmentary and incoherent.</i>

Page 3	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE A LEVEL – October/November 2013	9697	31

Section A

- 1 'Primary responsibility for the United Nations' failure to take effective measures against the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1990 rests with China'. How far do sources A–E support this view?

L1 WRITES ABOUT THE HYPOTHESIS, NO VALID USE OF SOURCES [1–5]

These answers will write about the Khmer Rouge 1975–91 and might use the sources. However, candidates will not use the sources as information/evidence to test the given hypothesis. If sources are used, it will be to support an essay-style answer to the question.

L2 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM THE SOURCES TO CHALLENGE OR SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [6–8]

These answers use the sources as information rather than as evidence, i.e. sources are used at face value only with no evaluation/interpretation in context.

L3 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM SOURCES TO CHALLENGE AND SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [9–13]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves both attempting to confirm and to disprove it. However, sources are still used only at face value.

L4 BY INTERPRETING/EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE OR SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [14–16]

These answers are capable of using sources as evidence, i.e. demonstrating their utility in testing the hypothesis, by interpreting them in their historical context, i.e. not simply accepting them at their face value.

L5 BY INTERPRETING/EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE AND SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [17–21]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves attempting both to confirm and disconfirm the hypothesis, and are capable of using sources as evidence to do this (i.e. both confirmation and disconfirmation are done at this level).

L6 AS L5, PLUS EITHER (a) EXPLAINS WHY EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE/SUPPORT IS BETTER/PREFERRED, OR (b) RECONCILES/EXPLAINS PROBLEMS IN THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT NEITHER CHALLENGE NOR SUPPORT IS TO BE PREFERRED [22–25]

For (a) the argument must be that the evidence for agreeing/disagreeing is better/preferred. This must involve a comparative judgement, i.e. not just why some evidence is better, but also why other evidence is worse.

For (b) include all L5 answers which use the evidence to **modify** the hypothesis (rather than simply seeking to support/contradict) in order to improve it.

Page 4	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE A LEVEL – October/November 2013	9697	31

Context

Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge came to power in Cambodia in 1975. What started as a small communist uprising against Prince Sihanouk's government became a formidable force which took over the entire country. Two externally driven factors contributed to the Khmer Rouge's rise: massive bombings in eastern Cambodia by the US during the period 1969-1973 and the overthrow of Sihanouk by a pro-American, right-wing general. Together these acts alienated youth and the rural population, leading them into the arms of the Khmer Rouge, who used them to terrorise the nation. Sihanouk, an exile in Beijing, embraced Pol Pot, and China provided financial and military support. The Khmer Rouge began to 'reform' Cambodia based on policies of Maoism and medievalism. The horrors of the regime only became clear after the Khmer Rouge were driven from Cambodia by the Vietnamese in 1979. Embarrassed by its own defeat in Vietnam, the USA sought improved relations with China. It was these big-power manoeuvres which were to make the United Nations impotent in its attempts to deal with the Khmer Rouge and to help the people of Cambodia recover from the Pol Pot regime.

Source A

Context: Vietnamese delegate addressing the UN Security Council on 11 January 1979, four days after the Khmer Rouge had been removed as the government of Cambodia.

Face Value: China supported Pol Pot against Vietnam because of its desire for expansion in Southeast Asia. China prevented the UN Security Council from supporting Vietnam's peace proposals. (**Y – China prevented the UN from taking action against Pol Pot**).

Beyond Face Value: The date of this source, (**X-Ref with E**), suggests that the focus of the Security Council meeting was Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia rather than the Pol Pot regime. It is clear from Source D that Western Powers opposed Vietnam's actions in Cambodia (**X-Ref with D**). The Vietnamese delegate tries to justify Vietnam's 'invasion' of Cambodia and has a vested interest in claiming its legitimacy by showing that Vietnam had no choice because of the UN's failure to respond to Vietnam's peace proposals. The source has reason to exaggerate the excesses of the Khmer Rouge and the possible influence of China. However, its views on these issues are supported by other sources (**X-Ref with B, C, D and E**). The source also claims that the new Vietnamese-backed government of Cambodia is keen to pursue a policy of 'peace, friendship and non-alignment' to the benefit of 'peace and stability'. This is intended to provide justification for the Vietnamese 'invasion' but its credibility is enhanced by cross-referencing with other sources (**X-Ref with D and E**). The delegate demonstrates the adverse impact of Cold War intrigues on the situation in Cambodia, something which is reflected in the other sources. While the provenance leads us to be sceptical about its contents, the source can be substantiated by cross-reference. (**Y**). However, source's utility is limited by its date, as it covers only 1975-79 (**X-Ref with C**).

Source B

Context: Article from an American publication in 1990, eleven years after the Khmer Rouge had been removed from power in Cambodia but effectively held the Cambodian seat in the UN General Assembly. The source comes from a magazine which is critical of the CIA.

Face Value: The USA has supported the Khmer Rouge in exile since their overthrow by Vietnam. It is critical of US actions in assisting the Khmer Rouge to carry on a guerrilla war against the Vietnamese-backed Cambodian government. (**N – USA is primarily responsible for the Khmer Rouge's continued existence**).

Page 5	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE A LEVEL – October/November 2013	9697	31

Beyond Face Value: The source blames the USA for the fact that the Khmer Rouge was continuing a guerrilla war against the Vietnamese-backed Cambodian government as late as 1990; eleven years after Pol Pot had been removed from power. The USA, it claims, has put pressure on UN aid agencies to assist the Khmer Rouge. As a result of its Cold War policies, the USA refused to accept Vietnam's control over Cambodia and was prepared to support a movement which the world viewed as genocidal to achieve its aims. **(N – USA is primarily responsible for the continuation of the Khmer Rouge problem)**. However, the source is politically motivated and this is clear from its use of emotive language. The final sentence implies that the USA acted in isolation and against the wishes of the '*international community*' which has condemned the Khmer Rouge as '*genocidal*'. This is challenged by Sources D and E which argue that China and some of the USA's allies also supported the Khmer Rouge (**X-Ref with D and E**). The article disapproves of the US Cold War policy of supporting China as a common enemy of Vietnam and the USSR, and blames this for the USA's unacceptable on-going support for the Khmer Rouge. To some extent this undermines its credibility and reliability. However, the allegation that the USA continued to back the Khmer Rouge between 1979 and 1990 is supported by Sources D and E. Even Source C, which suggests the USA could not take action against the Khmer Rouge because of its own defeat in Vietnam, stresses that the USA condemned Vietnam's 'invasion' of Cambodia (**X-Ref with C, D and E**). Source B disagrees with the hypothesis. It blames the USA for manipulating aid agencies and providing support to the Khmer Rouge. While this was because of its strategic alliance with China, the source holds the USA responsible (**N**).

Source C

Context: From a lecture in 1992.

Face Value: There were many reasons why the UN failed to take action against the Khmer Rouge. The source suggests China might have used its veto in the Security Council to prevent UN action. The source argues that the USSR was also likely to do this while third world states would have opposed UN interference in the affairs of another member state. **(N – China was no more responsible than the USSR and third world nations)**.

Beyond Face Value: This source is focused on the period between 1975 and 1979. The author has a particular interest in the alleged genocidal activities of the Khmer Rouge regime. The source suggests a number of reasons why the UN had not taken action: the full extent of Khmer Rouge activities did not become clear until after the regime fell to the Vietnamese in 1979; the USA and its western allies were unwilling to become involved in another ground war in Southeast Asia following defeat in Vietnam; the UN did not have the right to interfere in the affairs of a member state without that state's permission. The UN's failure to take action against the Khmer Rouge regime was the result of its own Charter and structure, and China cannot be singled out for blame (**N**). The source states that the UN was '*paralysed by the likelihood of Security Council vetoes ... by China*'. This is supported by Source A, which claims that China would have prevented Security Council unanimity. Both sources imply that this was a '*likelihood*' rather than a fact, suggesting that the Security Council never debated the issues involved and no vetoes were used (**X-Ref with A**). The source states '*humanitarian intervention did not occur until Vietnam overthrew the Khmer Rouge in 1979*' - this implies that the author approved of the Vietnamese take-over of Cambodia, leading to the implied criticism of the West in condemning '*the Vietnamese invasion in UN resolutions*' (**X-Ref with A, in which Vietnam seeks to justify its invasion of Cambodia; X-Ref with B, D and E, which reveal the implications of the West's opposition to Vietnam's actions in Cambodia**). Source C disagrees with the hypothesis. No blame can be apportioned to any particular country and certainly not China. The West's refusal to accept the Vietnamese take-over of Cambodia was an inevitable product of Cold War realities, while the UN was paralysed by the terms of its own Charter (**N**).

Page 6	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE A LEVEL – October/November 2013	9697	31

Source D

Context: From an article by an investigative journalist in 1992.

Face Value: It was as a direct consequence of the US bombing of Cambodia that Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge came to power (**N – USA not China responsible**). The USA and China did not approve of the Vietnamese take-over of Cambodia, and continued to support the Khmer Rouge as a way of removing Vietnam. This involved manipulating the UN, leading to on-going suffering for the people of Cambodia (**Y and N – China partly responsible, but the USA and her allies equally responsible**).

Beyond Face Value: The source puts the Khmer Rouge issue into its Cold War context. In a desperate attempt to 'win' the Vietnam War, the USA bombed neutral Cambodia. The author, who describes this bombing as '*illegal*', claims that this helped Pol Pot gain power. Defeat in the Vietnam War led the USA to seek a strategic alliance with China (**X-Ref with B**), which was also enemies with communist Vietnam and the USSR. Both the USA and China opposed the Vietnamese 'invasion' of Cambodia and it was this which led both countries, and their allies, to continue supporting the Khmer Rouge in exile. As a result, the UN was exploited by the USA, China and their allies – the Cambodian UN seat remained in the hands of the Khmer Rouge and Cambodia was subjected to an on-going civil war (**X-Ref with B and E**). (**Y and N – UN's failure was due to Cold War realities; China supported the Khmer Rouge between 1979 and 1991, thereby preventing action from the UN. However, the USA was equally, if not more, responsible**). The author's tone is angry and sarcastic. This anger is primarily directed at the USA. While the USA's motives are established, China's motives are not discussed (**X-Ref with A, which suggests that China was seeking expansionism in Southeast Asia**). As a reporter in Britain, it is not surprising that the writer would concentrate on the actions of the Western powers, especially the USA and Britain. Thus, the source perhaps understates the role of China. The source shows that China continued to support the Khmer Rouge after its removal from power in 1979, but the primary blame for the UN's mishandling of the situation is reserved for the USA and her Western allies (**N**).

Source E

Context: From a 2008 article by the former UN Secretary-General's Representative in Cambodia.

Face Value: The source claims that the Khmer Rouge was sustained by '*massive Chinese aid*'. China continued to support the Khmer Rouge after its removal from power, spearheading the resolution which enabled the Khmer Rouge to retain Cambodia's UN seat even while in exile. (**Y**). However, the USA is equally responsible because it refused to accept the Vietnamese-backed government of Cambodia and supported China in enabling the Khmer Rouge to retain Cambodia's UN seat (**Y, but USA also responsible**).

Beyond Face Value: China is seen as the main supporter of the Khmer Rouge (**X-Ref with A**). (**Y**). However, the source also blames the USA for refusing to support the Vietnamese-backed government of Cambodia, even though it was acceptable to the Cambodian people (**X-Ref with D**). As a result of its Cold War strategies, the USA supported China in maintaining the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian UN seat. (**Y, but USA also at fault**). The author had a personal involvement in the Cambodian problem in his capacity as a UN representative. The tone of the extract reveals his frustration that the UN could not take effective action. The author describes the Vietnamese take-over of Cambodia as '*liberation from the horrors of the Khmer Rouge*' (**X-Ref with A**), and is angry that '*the US found it unacceptable for Cambodia to be ruled by a communist regime*'. It is ironic that the USA, in its determination to resist Soviet-Vietnamese communism, should have allied itself with the Chinese communists (**X-Ref with B**). That China,

Page 7	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE A LEVEL – October/November 2013	9697	31

the USA and her allies maintained the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian UN seat is confirmed by reference to D (**X-Ref with D**). It could be argued that, as a UN representative, the author is trying to deflect blame for the UN's failure to confront the Khmer Rouge problem away from the UN itself (**X-ref with D, whose final sentence implies direct criticism of the UN**). However, the source's tone gives no indication of this; if anything the source is critical of the UN for allowing itself to be manipulated. In general, the source supports the hypothesis. However, China is not entirely to blame; the USA is seen as complicit as a result of her own Cold War policies.

Conclusion

The UN's attempts to confront the Khmer Rouge, both when it was in power (1975–9) and subsequently (1979–91) were impeded by the Cold War. In the wake of defeat in Vietnam, the USA formed a strategic alliance with China. China's desire for expansionism into Southeast Asia (Source A) was confronted with Vietnamese (and Soviet) opposition. Despite their differences, China and the USA had common enemies, and both were in a position to manipulate the UN's decision-making processes. While Source C gives many reasons why the UN was unable to take action, Sources B, D and E establish that the Khmer Rouge retained international recognition long after its removal by the Vietnamese army. As a result, the Cambodian people were starved of much-needed aid and subjected to civil war. The UN's own frustration regarding this is implied in Source E.

There were many reasons why the UN failed to take action against the Khmer Rouge. The fault may have come from within the UN itself – the Charter makes it difficult to intervene in the internal affairs of a member state and the structure allows members of the Security Council to prevent UN action through their right of veto. It could be argued that the USA and her western allies should bear the brunt of the responsibility – the USA's illegal bombing of Cambodia in a desperate attempt to gain success in its war in Vietnam created a situation which allowed Pol Pot to gain power in the first place, and their manipulation of the UN to ensure continued recognition of the Khmer Rouge in the period from 1979-91. While Sources B and D imply that the USA and her allies were mainly responsible, these were written by western authors, one of whom was politically motivated and one of whom was incensed by the British government. Underlying all of the sources is the fact that China provided support to the Khmer Rouge, both in power and in exile. Source A claims that China's actions were conditioned by her desire for expansion in Southeast Asia. Perhaps this explains Source E's claim that '*massive Chinese aid was the lifeblood of the Khmer Rouge*'.

Page 8	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE A LEVEL – October/November 2013	9697	31

Section B

2 ‘The USA did not understand the Soviet Union’s desperate desire for security.’ How adequately does this explain the onset of the Cold War between 1945 and 1949?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that Stalin’s motives were defensive, designed to prevent future attacks on the USSR from the west. The USA misinterpreted Stalin’s reasons for wanting a ‘buffer zone’ in Eastern Europe and his desire to keep Germany weak and divided, assuming these were signs of Soviet aggression and expansionism. The USA mistakenly saw the growth of communist parties in European countries (e.g. France, Greece and Turkey) as evidence of Soviet expansionism. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were designed to provide political and economic support to vulnerable European, thus containing the threat of Soviet expansionism. In turn, Stalin misinterpreted US motives as aggressive rather than defensive.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that the traditional view is correct and that Stalin’s motives really were expansionist; far from misunderstanding Stalin’s motives, the USA understood them only too well. Recently available Soviet sources suggest that this view has merit, and it is largely supported by post-post revisionist historians. The hypothesis could be challenged by reference to the revisionist interpretation – Truman had his own ambitions based on the desire to gain economic advantage in a resurgent European market; thus the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were part of USA strategy to ensure that Europe remained primarily capitalist because this was in America’s best interests (‘dollar imperialism’). The revisionist interpretation would suggest that the USA’s motives were not determined by a misunderstanding of Soviet actions since they would have been the same regardless of whether Stalin was being defensive or aggressive. Another interpretation might be that both the USA and the USSR had expansionist ambitions based on diametrically opposed aims, which inevitably led them into conflict.

3 ‘There is no convincing evidence that the Soviet Union had expansionist ambitions.’ How far do you agree with this judgement on the globalisation of the Cold War from 1950 to 1976?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that the USA was more responsible for the globalisation of the Cold War than the USSR. In its determination to preserve and extend its economic influence, the USA incorrectly perceived a communist plot to take over the world following the emergence of China as a communist state in 1949. This led to an enhancement of its containment policy through NSC-68, roll-back and the domino theory, together with American involvement in Korea, Vietnam, SE Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. In pursuing these policies, the USA encouraged the emergence of communist regimes, such as those in Cambodia and Laos. The USSR’s actions in Cuba, for example, could be seen as an attempt to protect a vulnerable communist state from self-interested American aggression rather than a reflection of Soviet expansionism. It could also be argued that de-colonisation was a key factor in the globalisation of the Cold War, since it created a series of regional conflicts into which the superpowers became inevitably if reluctantly involved (Mozambique and Angola for example).

Arguments which challenge the hypothesis might include Stalin’s statements regarding world communist revolution, Soviet support for the communist take-over in China and Soviet involvement in Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Africa and the Middle East. Although Khrushchev developed the policy of ‘peaceful coexistence’, this did not mean that he had given up on the idea of a communist-dominated world; he was merely arguing that what could not be achieved by war could be realised by demonstrating the superiority of the Soviet economic system and by winning over neutral states with lavish communist aid.

Page 9	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE A LEVEL – October/November 2013	9697	31

4 'The USA lost more than it gained from its involvement in the Korean War.' How far do you agree?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that 'roll-back' failed and led to splits in the US leadership regarding policy. Many Republicans claimed that the USA had missed an opportunity to destroy communism in China; this contributed to some of the later excesses of McCarthyism. China had prevented the unification of Korea under US influence and was now a world power. That the PRC was still denied a seat at the UN seemed even more unreasonable now. The outcome of the Korean War brought a new dimension to the Cold War. US relations with China and the USSR were permanently strained. This posed future threats to US interests in Asia, forcing the USA to establish SEATO. China also posed a new threat to US interests in Europe, Africa and Latin America. Fuel had been added to the USSR's claim that the UN was merely a 'tool of the capitalists'. The USA had taken little account of the desires of the Korean people.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that the USA's aim of protecting South Korea from communism had been achieved. Truman claimed that communism had been successfully contained in Korea, and that this, together with American rearmament, would dissuade world communism from further aggression. The USA gained international prestige at the height of the Cold War by claiming to have worked together with the UN to reverse an act of communist aggression.

5 Compare and contrast the ways in which Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR and Deng Xiaoping in China attempted to deal with the problems they faced.

The two leaders shared similar aims – both saw a fundamental need to enhance stagnating economies. The USSR had suffered from years of ineffective leadership, while China was in chaos following Mao's 'cultural revolution'. This was reflected by perestroika in the USSR and by Deng's move towards market socialism in China. For both leaders, this meant relaxing the principles of communism to accommodate some aspects of capitalism.

However, the two leaders differed over how this could be achieved. For Gorbachev, economic reform could only be accomplished if it was linked to political reform; hence glasnost and attempts to reform the communist party. Deng's early relaxation of strict communist control (the Four Modernisations, granting some religious and intellectual freedom, the Democracy Wall) led to demands for greater freedom; he quickly came to the conclusion that the move to market socialism could only be achieved through strict adherence to the one-party system. While the impact of Gorbachev's reforms was to split the communist party, Deng maintained total control through political manoeuvring and the support of the army.

While there were similarities between the respective problems which Deng and Gorbachev were seeking to address, there were also significant differences, which partly explain their approaches. The USSR's Cold War commitments and involvement in the nuclear arms race, had been a major drain on its economic resources. Reagan's hard-line policies increased the pressure. Gorbachev's solution was to seek improved relations with the West, but this required the USSR to adopt a more 'democratic' and 'humanitarian' approach. Gorbachev was also faced with the problem of nationalism, both with the USSR and in Eastern Europe; it was no longer viable for the USSR to resist nationalist uprisings, and so Gorbachev rescinded the Brezhnev Doctrine. While Gorbachev had little option but to adopt this approach, Deng was able to maintain strict communist control without worrying about the international reaction, as demonstrated in Tiananmen Square.

Page 10	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE A LEVEL – October/November 2013	9697	31

6 How effective were attempts to control the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons in the 1960s?

In support of the view that the attempts were effective, it could be argued that the Cuban missile crisis exposed the dangers of massive retaliation and brinkmanship and demonstrated the need for greater understanding between the USSR and the USA (and other nuclear powers). The Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was signed by the USA, USSR and Britain; it banned the testing of nuclear weapons above ground and below water, which would inhibit the development of new weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states; its effectiveness can be gauged by the fact that it still exists today, and the number of states with nuclear weapons remains relatively small.

In challenging the view it could be argued that the new strategy of mutually assured destruction assumed that both the USA and the USSR had sufficient weapons to act as a deterrent; any development by one necessitated a similar or improved development by the other. In its attempt to close the missile gap the USSR increased its development of ICBMs and SLBMs. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was only a limited ban – testing underground was still permitted, and, therefore, it did not stop the development of new weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty had major limitations and it did not stop the development of new and different weapons by the superpowers; India, Pakistan and Israel refused to sign, North Korea withdrew in 2003, while others (e.g. Libya, Iran) have been found in breach. It is extremely difficult to monitor and enforce.

It could be argued that while the 1963 and 1968 Treaties achieved little in themselves, they were vital in establishing the principle of talks regarding nuclear weapons. In this sense, they were vital precursors of subsequent, more effective discussions.

7 ‘Japan’s remarkable economic growth after 1945 was dependent on the support it received from the USA.’ How far do you agree?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that the USA viewed Japan as a bulwark against communism in Southeast Asia and afforded Japan favourable trading arrangements. With the USA providing security, Japan had no need to spend money on re-armament and was in a position to invest in technology, industry and infrastructure. As much of Japan’s industry had been destroyed during WWII it could be rebuilt with modern, high-tech equipment. US involvement in Korea provided markets for Japanese products.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that internal issues were of more significance to Japan’s economic resurgence than US support. For example, the Liberal Democratic Party provided stable government from 1952 to 1993. Conservative in nature, it encouraged business practice, reformed land ownership and encouraged investment. It developed effective education policies to harness the potential of a hard-working population. The creation of MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) in 1949 was vital to Japan’s economic miracle. Its mission was to address the problems of rising inflation and falling productivity by coordinating Japan’s international trade policy. By working closely with other key institutions, such as the Bank of Japan, MITI facilitated the early development of many major industries by providing protection from import competition, technological intelligence, help in licensing foreign technology, access to foreign exchange and assistance in mergers. It provided administrative support and direction, both formal and informal, on modernisation, technology, investment in new plant and equipment, and domestic and foreign competition. The role of large companies in terms of investment and development was vital to Japan’s economic growth.

A balanced response might argue that Japan’s ‘economic miracle’ was dependent on the combined effects of internal and external factors. While US support provided a significant catalyst, favourable domestic circumstances were vital.

Page 11	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE A LEVEL – October/November 2013	9697	31

8 'The failure of the Brandt Report's attempt to address the problem of Third World poverty was entirely due to the self-interest of the world's richest nations.' Discuss.

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that the Brandt Report (1980) highlighted the problem of Third World poverty and the ever-widening North-South divide. It argued that it was in the rich countries' interests to make the 'south' more prosperous and that they should give 0.7% of their national income to poorer countries by 1985 and 1.0% by 2000. By 1985, only Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and France had achieved this target – USA gave only 0.24%, Britain 0.11%. As a result, the Brandt Report's other suggestions, relating to aid, were never fully implemented, and the poorer countries suffered at the hands of lenders such as the IMF and the World Bank, which were controlled by (and worked in the interests of) the USA and other rich nations. As a direct result, the poorer 'south' suffered unfair trade barriers, an over-generous system of subsidies which led to greater debt problems, and inadequate international aid. It could be argued that the 'south' remains economically dependent on the 'north' because of neo-colonialism – poorer countries were expected to provide raw materials to and buy manufactured products from the richer countries; no attempt was made to help poorer countries develop their own industries or move away from dependency on one-product economies. Despite the work of UNCTAD, poorer countries remained prey to rising prices for manufactured goods and financial aid given on a business basis (i.e. loans requiring interest payments).

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that there are other, more fundamental reasons, why the Third World has found it difficult to overcome the problem of poverty;

- much higher rate of population increase in the 'south' than in the 'north'
- problems associated with managing populations which were widely distributed over vast areas
- poorer countries suffered from internal dissensions, wars and civil wars
- corrupt and inefficient leadership in many poorer countries led to the misuse of well-intentioned foreign aid
- problems of drought and famine.