

**MARK SCHEME for the October/November 2011 question paper
for the guidance of teachers**

9697 HISTORY

9697/33

Paper 3 (International History, 1945–1991),
maximum raw mark 100

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes must be read in conjunction with the question papers and the report on the examination.

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GENERIC MARK BANDS FOR ESSAY QUESTIONS

Examiners will assess which Level of Response best reflects most of the answer. An answer will not be required to demonstrate all of the descriptions in a particular Level to qualify for a Mark Band.

Band	Marks	Levels of Response
1	21–25	The approach will be consistently analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. Essays will be fully relevant. The argument will be structured coherently and supported by very appropriate factual material and ideas. The writing will be accurate. At the lower end of the band, there may be some weaker sections but the overall quality will show that the candidate is in control of the argument. The best answers must be awarded 25 marks.
2	18–20	Essays will be focused clearly on the demands of the question but there will be some unevenness. The approach will be mostly analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. The answer will be mostly relevant. Most of the argument will be structured coherently and supported by largely accurate factual material. The impression will be that a good solid answer has been provided.
3	16–17	Essays will reflect a clear understanding of the question and a fair attempt to provide an argument and factual knowledge to answer it. The approach will contain analysis or explanation but there may be some heavily descriptive or narrative passages. The answer will be largely relevant. Essays will achieve a genuine argument but may lack balance and depth in factual knowledge. Most of the answer will be structured satisfactorily but some parts may lack full coherence.
4	14–15	Essays will indicate attempts to argue relevantly although often implicitly. The approach will depend more on some heavily descriptive or narrative passages than on analysis or explanation, which may be limited to introductions and conclusions. Factual material, sometimes very full, will be used to impart information or describe events rather than to address directly the requirements of the question. The structure of the argument could be organised more effectively.
5	11–13	Essays will offer some appropriate elements but there will be little attempt generally to link factual material to the requirements of the question. The approach will lack analysis and the quality of the description or narrative, although sufficiently accurate and relevant to the topic if not the particular question, will not be linked effectively to the argument. The structure will show weaknesses and the treatment of topics within the answer will be unbalanced.
6	8–10	Essays will not be properly focused on the requirements of the question. There may be many unsupported assertions and commentaries that lack sufficient factual support. The argument may be of limited relevance to the topic and there may be confusion about the implications of the question.
7	0–7	Essays will be characterised by significant irrelevance or arguments that do not begin to make significant points. The answers may be largely fragmentary and incoherent. Marks at the bottom of this Band will be given very rarely because even the most wayward and fragmentary answers usually make at least a few valid points.

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Section A

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE BUILD UP TO THE SIX DAY WAR, 1967

- 1 'UN Secretary-General U Thant was guilty of a fatal error of judgement when he ordered the withdrawal of UNEF in May 1967.' How far do Sources A–E support this view?

L1 WRITES ABOUT THE HYPOTHESIS, NO VALID USE OF SOURCES [1–5]

These answers will write about the UN and the build up to the Six Day War of 1967 and might use the sources. However, candidates will not use the sources as information / evidence to test the given hypothesis. If sources are used, it will be to support an essay-style answer to the question.

L2 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM THE SOURCES TO CHALLENGE OR SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [6–8]

These answers use the sources as information rather than as evidence, i.e. sources are used at face value only with no evaluation / interpretation in context.

L3 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM SOURCES TO CHALLENGE AND SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [9–13]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves both attempting to confirm and to disprove it. However, sources are still used only at face value.

L4 BY INTERPRETING / EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE OR SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [14–16]

These answers are capable of using sources as evidence, i.e. demonstrating their utility in testing the hypothesis, by interpreting them in their historical context, i.e. not simply accepting them at their face value.

L5 BY INTERPRETING AND EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE AND SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [17–21]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves attempting both to confirm and disconfirm the hypothesis, and are capable of using sources as evidence to do this (i.e. both confirmation and disconfirmation are done at this level).

L6 AS L5, PLUS EITHER (a) EXPLAINS WHY EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE / SUPPORT IS BETTER / PREFERRED, OR (b) RECONCILES / EXPLAINS PROBLEMS IN THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT NEITHER CHALLENGE NOR SUPPORT IS TO BE PREFERRED [22–25]

For (a) the argument must be that the evidence for agreeing / disagreeing is better / preferred. This must involve a comparative judgement, i.e. not just why some evidence is better, but also why other evidence is worse.

For (b) include all L5 answers which use the evidence to **modify** the hypothesis (rather than simply seeking to support/contradict) in order to improve it.

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CONTEXT:

The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was established at the end of the Suez crisis in 1956. Originally intended as a short-term peacekeeping mission, UNEF was still in place some ten and a half years later. It is a measure of the respect held for the UN at the time that a small force of less than 3,500 had been able to help prevent open war breaking out between Israel and her Arab neighbours for so long. Believing that the Arab world was now united in its hostility to Israel, that Syria, Kuwait, Algeria, Iraq and other Arab states would join forces with Egypt, President Nasser decided that the time was right for war in 1967. He demanded the immediate withdrawal of UNEF. He was within his legal rights to do so. Technically, under the terms of the UN Charter, U Thant had little option but to comply with Nasser's demand. U Thant made the decision to withdraw UNEF after consultation with senior UNEF personnel but without consultation with the General Assembly of the UN. He believed this would take too long, thus putting UNEF troops at risk. Besides, he knew that opinion would be deeply divided, a factor which would only make the decision harder and more contentious. An example of divided opinion could be seen in Canada; the Canadian government disagreed with U Thant's decision to withdraw, yet was quick to withdraw its own troops from UNEF once Nasser's troops had begun to mobilise. U Thant's original plan was that the withdrawal should take about 4 or 5 months, enabling the UN to maintain some presence in the area as an incentive to avoid war. However, opposition (from USA, Britain and Canada especially) to his decision to withdraw, implying that U Thant had bowed down to Egyptian intimidation, merely added to Nasser's own determination to pursue his ambitions. He closed the Gulf of Aqaba, an act of war as far as Israel was concerned. Having sounded out opinion in both Europe and the USA, Israel pre-empted an Arab attack on 5 June 1967. Arab forces were quickly defeated.

SOURCE A:

Context:

Senior British politician speaking on 18 May – after Nasser's request for UNEF to leave but before U Thant's formal announcement of its withdrawal.

Content (Face Value):

The speaker believes that UNEF has served a vital purpose in keeping peace in the area and that it would be foolish for it to leave at a time when tensions were beginning to rise. He feels that a withdrawal of UNEF would seriously injure the reputation of the peacekeeping role of the UN. He argues that any decision regarding the future of UNEF should only be taken after full consultation at the UN; the UN should not be told what to do by Nasser. **Supports the hypothesis. The speaker believes that, as a peacekeeping force, UNEF should remain in post at a time when there is the greatest threat to peace. U Thant should not bow to the pressure put on him by Nasser, but should refer the matter to the full body of the UN.**

Content (Beyond Face Value):

While the speaker's argument appears logical, it is over-simplistic. He believes that UNEF should remain in position as a peacekeeping force at a time when peace is most threatened (*cross-reference with Source C*). He also believes that the UN should not give in to Arab pressure and that the matter should be referred to the UN General Assembly. He believes that a withdrawal of UNEF would do major damage to the prestige of the UN as a peacekeeper (*cross-reference with Sources C and E*). **Given that U Thant did make the decision to withdraw UNEF without full consultation at the UN, (*cross-reference with Source B*), the source clearly supports the hypothesis.**

U Thant's initial reaction to Nasser's request for the withdrawal of UNEF seems to have been similar to the views expressed in Source A (*cross-reference with Source D, first two lines*). However, Source A is simplistic in that it takes no account of two important factors. Firstly, Nasser was within his legal rights to demand the withdrawal of UNEF. Established at the end of the Suez crisis in 1956, its purpose had been to police the Egyptian border following the removal of British, French and Israeli troops with the full permission and cooperation of the Egyptian government. If that permission were

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to be retracted, UNEF had no mandate to be there (*cross-reference with Sources B and D*). Secondly, UNEF was a small multi-national force. It was primarily symbolic and certainly not equipped to undertake enforcement activities (*cross-reference with Source B*). Arab mobilisation would have been a significant threat to UNEF troops and U Thant would have had a duty to ensure their safety (*cross-reference with Source C*). Some countries had already made the decision to withdraw their troops from UNEF even before the decision had been made to withdraw UNEF itself (*cross-reference with Source D*). U Thant would have had to act quickly. Arguably, calling a full meeting of the UN General Assembly would have taken too long and put the UNEF troops at risk. **Thus, while Source A supports the hypothesis, it does so in over-simplistic terms and fails to take into account the conflicting pressures being imposed on U Thant.**

SOURCE B:

Context:

Address by the Secretary-General to the Security Council following his decision to withdraw UNEF but before the outbreak of open hostility.

Content (Face Value):

UN Secretary-General U Thant is explaining to the Security Council his decision to order the withdrawal of UNEF. He says that Nasser had the right to ask for the removal of UNEF and that UNEF's purpose was ended once Arab troops mobilised. The withdrawal of UNEF had been decided before U Thant issued the order. **Challenges the hypothesis. U Thant had no choice but to order the withdrawal of UNEF.**

Content (Beyond Face Value):

U Thant claims that UNEF could not survive without Egypt's consent and goodwill. Once these were withdrawn and Arab mobilisation had begun, the position of UNEF was untenable. **Challenges the hypothesis. U Thant had no choice but to order the withdrawal of UNEF.**

This address was made the day after U Thant formally ordered the withdrawal of UNEF (*cross-reference with Source C*). He is effectively informing the Security Council of his decision and the reasons for it. It is clear from this that U Thant had not consulted with the Security Council prior to making his decision. **Supports the hypothesis. U Thant made his decision very quickly and without the full consultation which many deemed necessary** (*cross-reference with Source A*).

The tone appears apologetic; U Thant realised that his decision would not be popular with all members of the Security Council given that war between Arabs and Israelis was now highly likely, and seeks to justify it. He explains that UNEF had carried out its functions effectively, but stresses that ten years is a long time for a country to host foreign troops. He stresses that Nasser had every right to demand the withdrawal of UNEF. He claims that UNEF's function and tenability were both ended once the Arab troops had begun to mobilise. The 'symbolic' force of some 3,400 men would clearly not be in a position to maintain peace given the mobilisation of both Arab and Israeli forces (*cross-reference with Source D*). **Challenges the hypothesis, but does so in a way which suggests that U Thant himself was not entirely happy with the decision which he had been forced to make** (*cross-reference with Source D for U Thant's own initial reaction to Nasser's request for the withdrawal of UNEF*).

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SOURCE C:

Context:

From an article written five years after the Six Day War.

Content (Face Value):

The withdrawal of UNEF allowed Egyptian forces to gather on the border, leading to further action by Nasser (e.g. closing Gulf of Aqaba). Feeling threatened, the Israelis began a pre-emptive strike on 5 June. The source implies that this situation might have been avoided if UNEF had remained in place. There was considerable contemporary criticism of U Thant's decision to remove UNEF. **Supports the hypothesis. U Thant's decision was heavily criticised at the time and led to war between Israel and Arab states. The UN's credibility was damaged.**

Content (Beyond Face Value):

There is a strong implication in the source that U Thant either panicked or was bullied into withdrawing UNEF, an action which led to hostilities between the Arabs and the Israelis (*cross-reference with Source E*). **Supports the hypothesis. U Thant's decision seen as at least partly responsible for the outbreak of war and the subsequent deterioration in the authority and prestige of the UN.**

The title of the article suggests that it is likely to concentrate on criticisms of U Thant rather than any points which might support the logic of his decision. Nevertheless, the source shows that UNEF troops were being harassed before U Thant's decision to withdraw it; being forced to abandon observation posts would imply that UNEF would not be able to carry out its function effectively and that UNEF troops were at risk (*cross-reference with Sources B and D*). Egyptian troops were mobilising and posed a threat to Israel before U Thant's decision – therefore, it was not U Thant's decision to withdraw UNEF which caused the Six Day War. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to see what U Thant could have done to prevent hostilities between the Arabs and the Israelis. **Challenges the hypothesis; U Thant was in an impossible position. Any delay would have put UNEF troops at risk. Therefore, he had to act quickly and made the only decision that was practical.**

SOURCE D:

Context:

Memories of one of U Thant's most senior advisers seventeen years after the Six Day War.

Content (Face Value):

The source states that U Thant didn't want to remove UNEF, but had little choice. Once the Arabs had begun mobilisation, some countries withdrew their troops from UNEF. It would have been impossible to maintain supplies to UNEF troops without Egyptian cooperation. U Thant had no choice but to order the withdrawal of UNEF. There was criticism of his decision, but this was unfair and merely added to Nasser's bravado – e.g. closing the Gulf of Aqaba. **Challenges the hypothesis. U Thant had no choice but to withdraw UNEF which was already disintegrating anyway.**

Content (Beyond Face Value):

UNEF's position had become untenable once Arab mobilisation began (*cross-reference with Sources B and C*). Despite criticism of his decision (*cross-reference with Source C*), U Thant had no choice but to order the withdrawal of UNEF. It is interesting to note that the Canadians were very quick to criticise U Thant and claim that he was 'caving in to the Egyptian dictator', yet the Canadian government was quick to withdraw its own troops when they felt unsafe. U Thant's determination to preserve peace in the region is shown by his trip to Cairo to meet with Nasser. Nasser's unsupportive reaction was clear as he closed the Gulf of Aqaba while U Thant was en-route. The source comes from a senior UN official, who would have been close to U Thant and would have understood the

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conflicting pressures imposed on him. Equally, as a senior official of the UN, Urquhart would be keen to counter the criticism of U Thant and might be seen as unreliable for this reason. **Challenges the hypothesis. U Thant had no choice but to withdraw UNEF which was already disintegrating. Nasser's aggressive actions had begun before the withdrawal of UNEF (and despite its presence) and these, rather than U Thant's decision, led to the Six Day War.**

SOURCE E:

Context:

More recent article reviewing the decision to withdraw UNEF.

Content (Face Value):

UNEF had helped to keep the peace between Arabs and Israelis for over ten years. The Arab League could not carry out its desire to achieve 'the final liquidation of Israel' as long as UNEF was there and so asked for it to be withdrawn. U Thant withdrew UNEF, a decision which began the decline of UN peacekeeping. **Supports the hypothesis. U Thant's decision began the decline of UN peacekeeping.**

Content (Beyond Face Value):

The article implies that it was the presence of UNEF which had prevented open warfare between Arabs and Israelis for over ten years: as UNEF was there the Arab League could not carry out its desire to liquidate Israel. The implication is that if U Thant had rejected Nasser's demand to remove UNEF, the Six Day War would not have happened (*cross-reference with Source C*). **Supports the hypothesis. U Thant's decision began the decline of UN peacekeeping.**

However, the source gives a very one-sided version of the dilemma facing U Thant and contains emotive wording. The implication that the Arab League could not take action against Israel until UNEF was removed is highly debatable (*cross-reference with Sources B and D, both of which state that Arab mobilisation had begun before the withdrawal of UNEF*). The statement that U Thant 'believed that the UN could not maintain itself on the Egyptian border without the permission of the host country' is equally misleading – under the terms of the UN Charter and UNEF's own mandate, U Thant was right to believe this (*cross-reference with Source B*). **While the source supports the hypothesis, it is opinionated and simplistic in its analysis of the dilemma facing U Thant.**

CONCLUSION:

Speaking in the House of Commons on 30 May 1967, Edward Heath described U Thant's decision to withdraw UNEF as 'entirely incomprehensible'. In the same debate, Sir Alec Douglas-Home described the decision as 'a fatal and perhaps fateful error of judgement. This was the last chance for the UN to get a grip on themselves and apply the principles of their Charter.' The irony is that applying the principles of the Charter is exactly what U Thant was doing. Legally, UNEF had no right to remain without the permission of the Egyptian government. Pragmatically, it could not survive without their cooperation. It would seem sensible that a peacekeeping force should remain in an area threatened by war. The argument (pursued in Sources A, C and E) that U Thant's decision was wrong, makes perfect sense.

However, the counter-argument that U Thant had no choice but to order the withdraw of UNEF also makes sense. Many countries had already withdrawn their nationals from UNEF. The supply line to UNEF troops could not be maintained without the cooperation of the Egyptian authorities and UNEF troops were being put at risk by the mobilisation of Arab forces. Perhaps U Thant should have consulted more widely and called a full meeting of the UN General Assembly (as recommended by Source A). However, this would have taken time to organise and would have elicited many opposing viewpoints making the final decision harder rather than easier. Meanwhile, UNEF troops were at risk. There is little doubt that the withdrawal of UNEF did serious harm to the prestige, reputation and credibility of the UN as a peacekeeper. However, confronted with a dilemma, U Thant had to make a decision. Was it a 'fatal error of judgement' or a reasoned response to all the prevailing circumstances?

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Section B

2 'In 1945, Europe was devastated both politically and economically.' How far does this explain the outbreak of the Cold War between 1945 and 1949?

It could be argued that the defeat of Germany created a power vacuum in Europe. The traditional view suggests that this gave the USSR the opportunity to maintain and expand its control over the Eastern European lands which it had occupied during the Second World War, ignoring the agreements which it had made at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. Convinced that Stalin was intent on moving into Western Europe, Truman introduced the Truman Doctrine to provide assistance to those areas under threat from the Soviets. Based on the belief that communism thrives in areas of economic deprivation, Truman also introduced the Marshall Plan to provide economic aid to Western Europe. Truman and his allies believed that a strong Germany (both politically and economically) was essential in order to prevent further Soviet expansion. Stalin saw Truman's actions as a threat to the USSR and took action – e.g. Cominform, Berlin Blockade.

The revisionist view argues that Stalin's actions in Eastern Europe were not expansionist, but were designed to protect the USSR from another attack from the West. The political and economic fragility of post-war Europe gave the USA the opportunity to protect its own economic position by making Western Europe economically dependent upon the USA. The Marshall Plan can be seen as 'dollar imperialism' and the Truman Doctrine as a political threat to the USSR. The re-uniting of the three Western sections of Germany and the development of a new currency are seen by Stalin as a significant threat to the USSR, which had a vested interest in keeping Germany weak. The Berlin Blockade and Cominform could be seen as defensive strategies by the USSR, while it was the USA that was exploiting the political and economic weaknesses of Europe.

The post-revisionist view argues that it was misunderstandings and mistrust between the USA and the USSR which led to the Cold War. Both superpowers assume that the other was seeking to exploit the weaknesses of Europe, while, in reality, both were only trying to enhance their own security. The common element in each of these varying interpretations of the causes of the Cold War is the fact that Europe was politically and economically devastated at the end of the Second World War. Whether the superpowers saw this as a cause for concern or an opportunity, or both, is open to interpretation.

3 'The globalisation of the Cold War between 1950 and 1980 was entirely due to the USA's fear of communism'. How far do you agree?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that the USA over-reacted to what it saw as a Soviet attempt to encourage world-wide revolution, leading to containment, roll back, NSC-68 and the domino theory. Such fears were enhanced after the fall of China to communism in 1949; the USA saw the USSR and the PRC as forming a communist bloc which posed a threat to American political, economic and strategic interests. The USA became involved in a series of regional conflicts, whose causes were more to do with post-colonial nationalism than communist world domination; Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Cuba, Chile, Mozambique, Angola etc. could be cited as examples. Unwelcome American intervention often led such countries to seek help and support from the USSR, thus spreading the Cold War. The USA's support for unpopular and undemocratic regimes in many countries, together with the actions of the CIA across the globe, could be cited as further evidence.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that Stalin had explicitly outlined the notion of world-wide communist domination, while the USSR provided support to communists in China, Korea, Vietnam, Africa and South America. In installing nuclear weapons in Cuba, the USSR

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was directly threatening the USA itself. The USSR was becoming involved in regional disputes (e.g. in the Middle East) to protect her own political, diplomatic, strategic and economic interests, and was therefore responsible for spreading the Cold War.

It could be argued that it was not the fear of communism itself which caused alarm in the USA; rather it was the threat to its own political, diplomatic, strategic and economic interests. The USA could be seen as acting out of self-interest.

4 'A gamble that failed'. How fair is this as an evaluation of Khrushchev's decision to install nuclear weapons in Cuba?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that Khrushchev was seeking to take advantage of the emergence of an anti-American regime so close to the USA by developing political, diplomatic and economic ties with Cuba. In placing nuclear missiles there, he was trying to restore balance in the nuclear arms race by retaliating to the presence of US missiles in places near the USSR (e.g. Turkey) and, perhaps, testing the resolve of a new and inexperienced US President. He was hoping that the USA would not detect Soviet activities in Cuba until it was too late, and that such an act would enhance the prestige of the USSR within the communist world. However, the USA discovered what was happening and imposed a naval quarantine around Cuba, putting Khrushchev in a difficult position. Either he had to back down or risk sending Soviet ships carrying nuclear equipment through the American blockade, which would almost certainly have led to war. Khrushchev was forced to back down and order Soviet ships not to cross the blockade. Further negotiations led to the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in exchange for almost nothing (the removal of the USA's Jupiter missiles in Turkey was a secret element of the final agreement, and was largely meaningless since the USA had planned to remove them anyway). This was seen as a sign of weakness in both the USSR, where Khrushchev was removed from office shortly afterwards, and in the wider communist world (e.g. China). This argument follows the traditional view, which developed in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, when few sources were available (and all of them American). Strong action by Kennedy's USA was seen as forcing the USSR to back down.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that Khrushchev was trying to support a new and vulnerable Communist state. Cuba was threatened with invasion from the USA, as shown by the Bay of Pigs fiasco, on-going CIA attempts to unseat Castro and the regular transgression of Cuban air space by US war and spy planes. Placing a naval blockade around Cuba was in breach of the UN Charter. As an independent sovereign state, Cuba had the right to trade with whoever it so wished. It was American bravado which led to the stand-off between the two superpowers and threatened the world with nuclear war. More recently available evidence, much of it from Soviet and Cuban sources, suggests that both Kennedy and Khrushchev were prepared to make concessions. Kennedy himself has been heavily criticised for giving away too much under Soviet pressure. In addition to the agreement to remove American missiles from Turkey, Kennedy also gave a guarantee that the USA would not invade Cuba. If Khrushchev's aim was to protect a new and vulnerable communist state, it could be argued that, with this guarantee, his actions had been successful.

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5 'The power of the Chinese Communist Party was never under serious threat at any time in the 1980s'. How far do you agree?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that the CCP under Deng managed to combine economic reform (e.g. joining IMF and the World Bank, accepting foreign loans, profit-sharing schemes) with the maintenance of strong one-party political control. Deng was able to maintain control of the CCP itself by balancing the various factions within it – e.g. replacing the reformer Hu Yao Bang with Zhao Zi Yang, who was an economic reformer but not interested in political reform; similarly, after Tiananmen Square, Deng supported the hard-liner Li Peng. The CCP maintained control of the army throughout the 1980s, and it was this which enabled it to disperse student riots. Deng was strong enough to resist international criticism, convinced that one-party control was needed to supervise the transition to a 'socialist market economy'.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that by reversing the changes made during the Cultural Revolution, establishing economic reforms and allowing greater social freedom (e.g. in religion, for intellectuals in literature and the arts, Democracy Wall), the CCP created the demand for more radical reform (e.g. the right to criticise the government, representation for non-communist parties, freedom to travel abroad, abolition of communes). Such reforms led to a split in the CCP itself, due to the opposition of more traditional, conservative members. High profile student demonstrations in 1986, which supported Deng's Four Modernisations but demanded greater democracy, caused further splits within the CCP. These were enhanced by the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989, which also led to world-wide condemnation of Deng's government.

6 How successful were attempts to control the development of nuclear weapons between 1949 and 1980?

Evidence to show that the attempts to control the development of nuclear weapons between 1949 and 1980 were largely unsuccessful might include the fact that there was a constant build-up of nuclear arms by both the USA and the USSR, while other countries (e.g. UK, France, China) gained nuclear capability. The USSR's development of the atomic bomb in 1949 led the USA to vastly increase its own expenditure on arms (massive retaliation). By 1953, both superpowers had developed hydrogen bombs. Even the move to Mutually Assured Destruction after 1962 failed to impose any effective restriction on the development of nuclear arms. Hence the development of ICBM, SLBM, ABM and MIRV. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was limited in its scope and almost impossible to monitor effectively, while the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty of 1968 was never endorsed by India, Pakistan and Israel (South Korea signed the Treaty but subsequently withdrew from its commitment). The SALT Treaties were limited in scope and SALT II was never ratified due to Soviet activity in Afghanistan.

Evidence to show that attempts to control the development of nuclear weapons did have some success might include the fact that Test Ban treaties did make it harder for non nuclear states to develop nuclear capability. The NNPT has limited the proliferation of nuclear weapons with only a relatively small number of countries failing to honour it. While limited in scope, the SALT Treaties did impose limits on certain types of nuclear weapons and could be seen as a vital precursor to subsequent, more effective treaties (e.g. START). The effectiveness of attempts to control nuclear weapons was clearly enhanced during periods of detente (e.g. 1970s).

7 To what extent was the success of the international economy dependent upon the success of the US economy in the period from 1945 to 1991?

It could be argued that the USA emerged from the Second World War as the strongest economy remained as the largest throughout the period. The post-war recovery of the international economy was heavily dependent on the USA – e.g. helping the recovery of the Western

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European economy through Marshall Aid, giving preferential treatment to Japan, the importance of the dollar and the crucial role of the USA in terms of GATT, Bretton Woods, the World Bank and IMF. Moreover, the problems facing the US economy in the 1970s were reflected across much of the international economy (e.g. collapse of Bretton Woods, devaluation of the dollar, rising oil prices due to OPEC). However, while the USA remained in a dominant position even after the 1970s, its dominance of the international economy was no longer so profound. The recovery of West Germany, the 'economic miracle' in Japan and the rise of the Asian Tigers were all significant factors. The international economy was no longer so dependent on the US economy.

8 'Internal rather than external factors better explain the emergence of the Asian Tiger economies'. How far do you agree?

Relatively undeveloped at the beginning of the 1960s, the original Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea) experienced rapid economic growth between the 1960s and 1990s. Within twenty years, they achieved the industrial transition to an urbanised work force (largely in the high-productivity sectors of manufacturing and services), the demographic transition to societies with low death and birth rates, and the educational transition to high rates of literacy. In 1963, they accounted for 1.6% of the world's total exports; by 1988 they accounted for 8.1% (almost as much as Japan – 9.6%).

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that all of the Asian Tigers benefitted from similar internal factors, such as:

- non-democratic and relatively authoritarian political systems, providing some degree of state control over economic growth; in South Korea, military rule pushed through forced industrialisation based on the Japanese model; the government controlled banks, the Economic Planning Board and encouraged conglomerates (e.g. Hyundai, Samsung); in Taiwan, there was a large state sector, tightly controlled and efficiently run; Singapore and Hong Kong practiced state socialism, funding key infrastructure projects and controlling housing and development
- export-led growth; South Korea exported cars but imports were banned; South Korea and Taiwan imported materials and components from Japan and then exported the finished products, primarily to USA; Singapore and Hong Kong relied on free trade
- favourable demography – availability of cheap labour – e.g. from agricultural sector in South Korea and Taiwan, exiles from China in Hong Kong
- improved educational systems to provide a well-educated, skilled work force
- tax and savings incentives, coupled with high growth and income rates
- flexibility; Taiwan moved from the production of cheap labour-intensive manufacture (e.g. textiles and toys) into the expansion of heavy industry and infrastructure; Hong Kong moved from textiles into electronics and high tech industries; Singapore became the centre of the new Asian Dollar Market after 1968

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that external factors were also important:

- benefitted economically from previous foreign rule or influence – British commerce in Hong Kong and Singapore; Japanese industrialisation and then American land reform in South Korea and Taiwan
- favourable trading agreements provided by USA and Japan
- foreign investment – e.g. South Korea benefitted from American aid; USA saw South Korea as a key to preventing the spread of communism in SE Asia; threatened with invasion from China, Taiwan relied on US security guarantee and economic aid; South Korea and Taiwan benefitted from soft loans from and joint industrial ventures with Japan