

**MARK SCHEME for the October/November 2011 question paper
for the guidance of teachers**

9697 HISTORY

9697/32

Paper 3 (International History, 1945–1991),
maximum raw mark 100

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes must be read in conjunction with the question papers and the report on the examination.

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Page 2	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	32

GENERIC MARK BANDS FOR ESSAY QUESTIONS

Examiners will assess which Level of Response best reflects most of the answer. An answer will not be required to demonstrate all of the descriptions in a particular Level to qualify for a Mark Band.

Band	Marks	Levels of Response
1	21–25	The approach will be consistently analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. Essays will be fully relevant. The argument will be structured coherently and supported by very appropriate factual material and ideas. The writing will be accurate. At the lower end of the band, there may be some weaker sections but the overall quality will show that the candidate is in control of the argument. The best answers must be awarded 25 marks.
2	18–20	Essays will be focused clearly on the demands of the question but there will be some unevenness. The approach will be mostly analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. The answer will be mostly relevant. Most of the argument will be structured coherently and supported by largely accurate factual material. The impression will be that a good solid answer has been provided.
3	16–17	Essays will reflect a clear understanding of the question and a fair attempt to provide an argument and factual knowledge to answer it. The approach will contain analysis or explanation but there may be some heavily descriptive or narrative passages. The answer will be largely relevant. Essays will achieve a genuine argument but may lack balance and depth in factual knowledge. Most of the answer will be structured satisfactorily but some parts may lack full coherence.
4	14–15	Essays will indicate attempts to argue relevantly although often implicitly. The approach will depend more on some heavily descriptive or narrative passages than on analysis or explanation, which may be limited to introductions and conclusions. Factual material, sometimes very full, will be used to impart information or describe events rather than to address directly the requirements of the question. The structure of the argument could be organised more effectively.
5	11–13	Essays will offer some appropriate elements but there will be little attempt generally to link factual material to the requirements of the question. The approach will lack analysis and the quality of the description or narrative, although sufficiently accurate and relevant to the topic if not the particular question, will not be linked effectively to the argument. The structure will show weaknesses and the treatment of topics within the answer will be unbalanced.
6	8–10	Essays will not be properly focused on the requirements of the question. There may be many unsupported assertions and commentaries that lack sufficient factual support. The argument may be of limited relevance to the topic and there may be confusion about the implications of the question.
7	0–7	Essays will be characterised by significant irrelevance or arguments that do not begin to make significant points. The answers may be largely fragmentary and incoherent. Marks at the bottom of this Band will be given very rarely because even the most wayward and fragmentary answers usually make at least a few valid points.

Page 3	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	32

Section A

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE VIETNAM WAR

1 How far do Sources A–E support the view that the USA was responsible for the UN's failure to arrange a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam War in the period from 1965 to 1967?

L1 WRITES ABOUT THE HYPOTHESIS, NO VALID USE OF SOURCES [1–5]

These answers will write about the UN and the Vietnam War with reference to the period from 1965–1967 and might use the sources. However, candidates will not use the sources as information / evidence to test the given hypothesis. If sources are used, it will be to support an essay-style answer to the question.

L2 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM THE SOURCES TO CHALLENGE OR SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [6–8]

These answers use the sources as information rather than as evidence, i.e. sources are used at face value only with no evaluation / interpretation in context.

L3 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM SOURCES TO CHALLENGE AND SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [9–13]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves both attempting to confirm and to disprove it. However, sources are still used only at face value.

L4 BY INTERPRETING / EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE OR SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [14–16]

These answers are capable of using sources as evidence, i.e. demonstrating their utility in testing the hypothesis, by interpreting them in their historical context, i.e. not simply accepting them at their face value.

L5 BY INTERPRETING AND EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE AND SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [17–21]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves attempting both to confirm and disconfirm the hypothesis, and are capable of using sources as evidence to do this (i.e. both confirmation and disconfirmation are done at this level).

L6 AS L5, PLUS EITHER (a) EXPLAINS WHY EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE / SUPPORT IS BETTER / PREFERRED, OR (b) RECONCILES / EXPLAINS PROBLEMS IN THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT NEITHER CHALLENGE NOR SUPPORT IS TO BE PREFERRED [22–25]

For (a) the argument must be that the evidence for agreeing / disagreeing is better / preferred. This must involve a comparative judgement, i.e. not just why some evidence is better, but also why other evidence is worse.

For (b) include all L5 answers which use the evidence to **modify** the hypothesis (rather than simply seeking to support/contradict) in order to improve it.

Page 4	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	32

CONTEXT:

Essentially a civil war, the conflict in Vietnam inevitably became a Cold War issue. The USA, convinced of the USSR's expansionist ambitions and concerned by the actions of communist China, was committed to the 'domino theory'. President Johnson believed that if South Vietnam fell to the communists the whole of Southeast Asia would be under threat. US policy was to protect the independent state of South Vietnam by whatever means possible. To the USSR and China, the actions of the USA in Vietnam amounted to unwarranted aggression. U Thant became frustrated at the failure of his many attempts to arrange a peaceful settlement to the Vietnam War. Essentially, the UN was powerless. The Security Council was in no position to take effective action – the USA did not want Security Council discussion on the issue, while the USSR realised that it would not be able to get the Security Council to condemn the aggressive actions of the USA. China was not allowed into the UN, a factor which U Thant strongly believed made it virtually impossible to negotiate a peaceful solution.

SOURCE A

Context:

Contemporary source. Speech by US President Johnson at the beginning of the period in question. By this stage, many Americans were beginning to question the USA's role in the Vietnam War. Johnson is justifying US involvement to a largely American audience.

Content (Face Value):

Johnson argues that the cause of the Vietnam War is the attack by North Vietnam on South Vietnam. He also argues that North Vietnam is being 'urged on' by China as part of her own wider aggressive purposes. **Challenges the hypothesis – the source does not refer to any action taken by the USA which might have hindered UN attempts to negotiate peace. North Vietnam and China are seen as the cause of the problem.**

Content (Beyond Face Value):

President Johnson is justifying US involvement in the Vietnam War to an American audience. While he states that it is a war of 'unparalleled brutality', he does not mention any action taken by the USA, but implies that such 'brutality' is entirely due to North Vietnam. American fears of communism are clearly apparent in statements such as 'it is the new face of an old enemy', possibly referring to the USSR. Such fears are heightened by the increasing power and aggressive actions of China (*cross-reference with Source B*). Johnson is keen to stress that the contest in Vietnam is not just a civil war, but has much wider implications. He is justifying US involvement in the war, yet he does not refer to any actions which the USA has taken in defence of South Vietnam which might themselves be viewed as aggressive. **Challenges the hypothesis – the source does not refer to any action taken by the USA which might have hindered UN attempts to negotiate peace. North Vietnam and China are seen as the cause of the problem. However, the source is clearly biased, laying all the blame on the communists in order to justify US involvement.**

SOURCE B:

Context:

Contemporary source. Cartoon from a British newspaper in September 1965. At this time the USA was actively bombing North Vietnam, causing much devastation and loss of civilian lives. U Thant became concerned that events in Vietnam were likely to develop into a major war between the superpowers. Many people believed that the exclusion of China from the UN was detrimental to attempts to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam War.

Page 5	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	32

Content (Face Value):

U Thant is depicted as suggesting to President Johnson that China should be admitted to the UN. Johnson is clearly against this because of China's aggressive behaviour, although Johnson is himself depicted in an aggressive pose. **Supports the hypothesis in the sense that the USA is seen as both aggressive and uncompromising, factors which would have inhibited UN attempts to negotiate a peaceful settlement.**

Content (Beyond Face Value):

The cartoon relates to American hypocrisy over the war in Vietnam. President Johnson is shown being highly aggressive (a clear reference to the recent US bombing of North Vietnam) yet opposing the inclusion of China in the UN because she 'is not peace-loving' (*cross-reference with Source A*). Johnson's posture suggests that he is incredulous at the notion of China's inclusion. Yet the fact that ten countries had expressed a wish to at least discuss the possibility, and the fact that U Thant himself seems to be supporting the idea, would imply that the actions of the USA were disliked in many quarters. The fact that this cartoon appeared in a British newspaper might support this viewpoint; Britain might have been expected to support US actions in Vietnam, yet this source would imply some British criticism of the USA's aggressive policy. The fact that Johnson is shown as wearing a sheriff's badge refers to the concept of the USA as 'policeman of the world', with a duty to protect the 'free world' from communism. **Supports the hypothesis in the sense that the USA is seen as both aggressive and uncompromising, factors which would have inhibited UN attempts to negotiate a peaceful settlement.** U Thant is drawn considerably smaller than Johnson; this would imply that he (and thus the UN) is less significant than the USA in attempts to seek an end to the Vietnam War. His deferential pose would imply that he lacks the prestige and charisma necessary to achieve a breakthrough. **Challenges the hypothesis – arguably, it was the weakness of the UN in general and U Thant in particular which prevented the achievement of a negotiated settlement.**

SOURCE C:

Context:

Contemporary source. By December 1966, U Thant was becoming increasingly frustrated at the failure of the many attempts to arrange a lasting ceasefire and peace deal in Vietnam. The USA was making little headway in the war and continuing to mount air attacks on North Vietnam which were denounced both internationally and within the USA itself. The war had become a stalemate – China made it clear that it would not permit the defeat of North Vietnam; the USA made it clear that it would not permit the defeat of South Vietnam.

Content (Face Value):

The source is highly critical of U Thant and supportive of President Johnson. U Thant's opinions are ridiculed and the implication is that the communists were only prepared to negotiate when it suited them. U Thant's openly expressed views are seen as unhelpful to any future attempts to negotiate a peace settlement. **Challenges the hypothesis. U Thant is seen as untrustworthy and ineffective and the implication is that this is the reason for the UN's failure. The USA is seen as rightly opposing the 'Reds' in support of the independent state of Vietnam.**

Content (Beyond Face Value):

At face value, the source rejects the criticisms which U Thant is alleged to have made regarding US policy in Vietnam. **Challenges the hypothesis.** U Thant is seen as both ineffective and untrustworthy in his capacity as Secretary-General of the UN; referred to as a 'sanctimonious fraud'. **Challenges the hypothesis – U Thant was not an effective agent for peace.** However, the source, which comes from an American newspaper, is highly biased in favour of US policy in Vietnam and written with heavy sarcasm. It belittles the notion that North Vietnam might have genuinely sought peace with the USA, claiming that any such offers would have been made out of self-interest. No evidence is given to support this view. The tone is anti-communist (*cross-reference with*

Page 6	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	32

Source A). The source uses the phrase 'even if we were to accept...'; this might suggest that there is some truth in the allegations. U Thant is seen as anti-American and a long-term supporter of communism. The source overstates U Thant's criticisms of the USA – he 'implied' rather than stated that Johnson was 'a warmonger'. The source is not reliable (*cross-reference with Source D*). **Supports the hypothesis. Whatever U Thant actually did say, he was critical to some extent of US policy and felt that the USA was hindering attempts to reach a peaceful solution to the Vietnam War.**

SOURCE D:

Context:

Contemporary source. The USA continued its air attacks on North Vietnam. The timing of these raids made any extension of the proposed Christmas / New Year truce highly unlikely.

Content (Face Value):

The source shows how the USA's bombing raids on North Vietnam were criticised by North Vietnam, the USSR and China, making an effective peace settlement highly unlikely. The raids were seen by U Thant as enhancing the danger of the Vietnam War escalating into a war between the superpowers. **Supports the hypothesis. The USA's air attacks, so close to the Christmas / New Year truce, were detrimental to any attempts to negotiate a peaceful settlement.**

Content (Beyond Face Value):

The source comes from an American newspaper, which reports what other sources said without making comment. There is no blatant bias in the source (although it does refer to the clandestine Vietcong 'Liberation Radio'). The USA's air attacks on North Vietnam so close to the truce were criticised by North Vietnam, the USSR and China, Soviet sources going so far as to call the attacks 'genocide'. U Thant was critical of the air attacks (*cross-reference with Source C*) and concerned that they would not only make it harder to negotiate a peace settlement but might intensify the war. The statement that the Peking 'People's Daily' warned that 'China would not tolerate a defeat of North Vietnam' would imply that North Vietnam would be unwilling to settle for any peace settlement which gave effective victory to the USA. This would suggest that North Vietnam was unwilling to become involved in genuine negotiations (*cross-reference with Sources C and E*). **Challenges the hypothesis. North Vietnam and China would be unwilling to accept any peace settlement which involved an effective defeat of North Vietnam.**

SOURCE E:

Context:

Contemporary source. Growing anti-war opinion in America and the high cost of fighting meant that, from late 1966, the USA showed some willingness to enter negotiations. However, still believing in the 'domino theory', the USA remained unwilling to accept the defeat of South Vietnam. The USA agreed to stop bombing North Vietnam, but only if they gave some sign that they would stop aggression against South Vietnam – at no point did the USA make it clear what sort of sign would be acceptable. North Vietnam, believing that the USSR and China would not allow her to be defeated, still insisted that the USA must stop its aggression before any settlement was possible.

Content (Face Value):

The USA is seen as willing to negotiate, while North Vietnam (banking on support from the USSR and China) is seen as refusing to accept U Thant's peace plan. **Challenges the hypothesis. It is North Vietnam and her allies (rather than the USA) who are preventing the success of the UN's peace proposals.**

Page 7	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	32

Content (Beyond Face Value):

The source reports on events with no real evidence of bias, and is thus relatively reliable. U Thant, still fearful of the war escalating, is seen as continuing his efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. The USA is seen as willing to cooperate, whereas North Vietnam (supported by the USSR and China) is not. North Vietnam is seen as wanting 'unilateral peace moves' by the USA – i.e. stopping the bombing of North Vietnam as a pre-requisite of peace negotiations. **Challenges the hypothesis. It is North Vietnam and her allies (rather than the USA) who are preventing the success of the UN's peace proposals.** However, the fact that the USA is seen in the 'unfamiliar' role as peace advocate would imply that many international observers believed that the USA was preventing viable peace negotiations (*cross-reference with Sources B, C and D*). The fact that 'there are some sceptics' would imply that not everyone was convinced by the USA's apparent willingness to negotiate. U Thant's three-stage plan is very basic and requires no real commitment by either side beyond a ceasefire; the real negotiations would not begin until Stage 3. It could be argued that the USA was not committing itself to anything by accepting the proposals. **Supports the hypothesis. The USA had clearly been seen as the reason why previous attempts to negotiate a peaceful settlement had failed. Similarly, acceptance of U Thant's Three-Stage Plan committed the USA to nothing.**

CONCLUSION:

The Vietnam War put the UN in an impossible position. Two members of the Security Council were intimately involved, while China (which U Thant considered to be the key to gaining a peace settlement in Vietnam) was barred from UN membership. It could be argued that inherent weaknesses within the structure of the UN were the key factor in preventing effective peace negotiations. Convinced of the expansionist nature of communism, the USA felt that it was essential to take a stand over South Vietnam. Unable to defeat the Vietcong in conventional warfare, the USA resorted to bombing raids on North Vietnam – this was a key factor in the failure of the UN to arrange an effective settlement. Convinced that the USSR and China would not let her down, North Vietnam was determined to continue the war until the USA was either defeated or sufficiently humiliated. With neither side willing to accept defeat, the UN could do little.

Page 8	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	32

Section B

2 'The USA's desire for economic growth and security was the main reason why the Cold War developed between 1945 and 1949'. How far do you agree?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that Truman's actions were less due to his inexperience in foreign policy or his hatred of communism than to his desire to ensure that the USA never again had to endure the circumstances which had prevailed during the Great Depression. The use of atomic bombs in Japan could be seen as the USA's attempt to prevent the USSR gaining a foothold in key areas, while the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan could be seen as attempts to secure American interests, primarily economic. Stalin, himself paranoid about security, saw this as 'dollar imperialism' and, fearing the re-emergence of a strong Germany, took action to secure a 'buffer zone' in Eastern Europe.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that the real causes of the Cold War were Stalin's statements regarding world-wide communist revolutions and his aggressive actions in Eastern Europe in breach of agreements made at Yalta and Potsdam (the 'traditional' and 'post post-revisionist' viewpoints). The USA's actions could thus be seen as responding to Soviet aggression in defence of her Western European allies (as indicated by the 'long telegram' and Churchill's 'iron curtain' speech). Alternatively, it could be argued that both the USA and the USSR were seeking security, and that they simply misunderstood each other's motives (the 'post-revisionist' argument).

3 'The globalisation of the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s is clear evidence that the USSR had expansionist ambitions'. How far do you agree?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that Stalin had spoken of world-wide communist revolution (although Khrushchev was subsequently to distance the USSR from this view). The USSR supported the communist revolution in China and provided equipment and military 'advisers' to the communist North in Korea (having given 'permission' for its attack on the South). Similarly, the USSR gave support to communists in Vietnam and other parts of South East Asia. The installation of nuclear weapons in Cuba could be seen as Soviet expansionism into Latin America, while the USSR was also actively involved in the Middle East. Under these circumstances, the USA had little alternative but to resist Soviet expansionism through the policies of containment and roll-back.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that American fears of a 'monolithic' communist attempt to 'take over the world' were misguided, and that it was US attempts to contain something which didn't really exist which caused the globalisation of the Cold War. Khrushchev distanced the USSR from the Marxist world-wide revolution concept, a key factor in deteriorating relationships between the USSR and the PRC. While the USSR did supply and 'advise' North Korea, its own involvement in the Korean War was limited and far less than that of the USA. Stalin had only given his 'permission' for the North to attack the South on the understanding that the USA would not become involved and was keen to avoid direct confrontation with the USA. Soviet support for communists in other parts of Southeast Asia was equally low-key. Soviet actions in Cuba could be seen as a genuine attempt to support a new and vulnerable communist state, while also attempting to redress the nuclear imbalance caused by the location of US missiles in Turkey. The Soviet presence in the Middle East could be seen as an attempt to protect the USSR's economic and strategic interests. It could be argued that American misunderstanding of Soviet motives was primarily responsible for the globalisation of the Cold War.

Page 9	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	32

4 Compare and contrast the involvement of the USA and the USSR in the Korean War.

Although not included in the USA's original defensive perimeter, anti-communist public pressure led the USA to become involved in the Korean War. In the USA, the actions of North Korea in attacking the South were seen as further evidence of a communist attempt to 'take over the world'. The USA became directly involved in the Korean War, albeit under the flag of the UN, whose support was guaranteed given the absence of the USSR from the Security Council. The USA's initial actions were successful in pushing the North Koreans back to the 38th parallel, but attempts to force their way into North Korea under MacArthur subsequently failed, partly due to the fact that this led to the involvement of the Chinese. It could be argued that in Korea containment was successful, but roll-back failed.

In contrast to the USA's direct involvement, the USSR's part in the Korean War was more indirect. Stalin was keen to avoid any direct confrontation with the USA. Significantly, North Korea felt the need to secure the 'permission' of Stalin before mounting its attack on the South. Initially reluctant, Stalin eventually relented in the belief that the USA would not become involved in what was essentially a regional conflict to secure the re-unification of Korea. Arguably, the USSR was seeking to secure its own strategic interests in the region, while also gaining prestige as the leader of the communist world. However, Stalin made it clear that the USSR would not become directly involved in the war. Soviet involvement was largely confined to the supply of equipment and 'advisers' to North Korea. It was the Chinese (protecting their own interests) rather than the Soviets who helped North Korea resist the advances of the USA under MacArthur. The UN's actions in Korea led the USSR to describe it as 'a tool of the USA'.

5 To what extent did Gorbachev's policies make the collapse of the USSR unavoidable?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that Gorbachev's attempt to address the problems facing the USSR by major social, economic and political reforms not only failed but also made the problems worse, as is evidenced by the negative impact of perestroika and glasnost. His ending of the Brezhnev Doctrine allowed latent nationalism to thrive both in Eastern Europe and within the Soviet Union itself. Gorbachev's policies created political divisions within the Soviet Union. This might be contrasted with China, where social and economic changes were made without political reform; it might be argued that this could explain why the PRC survived while the USSR did not.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that there were many other reasons why the USSR collapsed and that the state of the Soviet economy left Gorbachev with little choice but to reform. The USSR was no longer in a position to compete with the USA in the arms race, a factor which had become even more obvious with Reagan's development of SDI. Financially, the USSR could no longer afford to sustain war in Afghanistan or to 'prop up' the countries of Eastern Europe. Given the social and economic problems which the USSR was facing, Gorbachev had little choice but to seek agreement with the USA. Arguably this demanded political reform within the Soviet Union as well as reforms to address the economic problems.

Page 10	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	32

6 'The fact that so few states had nuclear weapons by 1991 shows that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 was a success'. How far do you agree?

It is necessary to establish 'success criteria' – in this case, the fairest would appear to be the original aims and terms of the NNPT itself, the three main 'pillars' of which were:

- Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons or 'in any way to assist, encourage or induce' non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to acquire them. NNWS agreed to allow verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEW)
- the desire of treaty signatories to ease international tension and strengthen international trust so as to create conditions in the future for a halt to the production of nuclear weapons
- allowing the transfer of nuclear technology and materials for the development of civilian nuclear energy programmes

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that, despite the original intention that the NNPT should last for 25 years, it is still in force and the number of recognised NWS remains relatively small (China and France added in 1992). Only four recognised states are not party to the treaty (India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea). Much of the criticism of the NNPT centres on the fact that nuclear weapons still exist in abundance; in many ways, this is unfair since it assumes that the three pillars were envisaged as of equal importance – in reality the NNPT was heavily focused on non-proliferation. Several NNPT signatories have given up nuclear weapon programmes (e.g. South Africa). Several former Soviet Republics destroyed or transferred nuclear weapons to Russia on the demise of the USSR.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that the NNPT failed in a number of ways:

- weapon sharing by the USA – nuclear weapons deployed in other NATO states
- three states declined to sign – India, Pakistan and Israel; India and Pakistan have publically announced possession of nuclear weapons; Israel is less open about its nuclear programme
- signatories in 1985, North Korea withdrew in 2003 and publically declared possession of nuclear weapons in 2005
- other countries (e.g. Iran, Libya) have been found in non-compliance with NNPT
- ineffectiveness of IAEW
- Non-Aligned Movement has stated that non-proliferation cannot be sustained without 'tangible progress in disarmament'

7 'The Japanese economic miracle was entirely due to favourable external circumstances'. How far do you agree?

In support of the hypothesis it could be argued that at the end of World War 2, Japan was threatened with economic ruin. Inflation, unemployment and shortages were all rife. Japan's post-war recovery was only possible because of investment and favourable trading agreements given by the USA, keen to ensure the democratisation of Japan and to secure an ally in their attempts to contain communism within Asia. The USA also enabled Japan to join GATT, despite opposition from the UK. Moreover, during the Korea War, Japan gained 'special procurement' deals from the USA, amounting to 27% of Japan's export trade.

In challenging the hypothesis it could be argued that, while USA assistance was vital for the initial recovery, it was internal factors which enabled Japan to continue to thrive, even after the USA's 'special favours' had ended. The Japanese government instituted policies which allowed Japan to overcome the deep recession caused by the removal of US special favours and to continue growth into the 1960s. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) formalised cooperation between the government and private industry. MITI allowed special deals for the import of certain types of technology which would assist Japanese industries. Eventually, MITI had control over all imports and power over the foreign exchange budget. MITI's establishment

Page 11	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	32

of the Japan Development Bank (1951) gave industry access to low-cost long-term capital. Prime Minister Hayata Ikeda began a policy of heavy industrialisation, relaxing the monopoly laws to facilitate the emergence of conglomerates which could become internationally competitive. Protectionism, in the form of import controls and preventing the foreign take-over of Japanese firms, was also employed. Ikeda also lowered interest rates and taxes, encouraging people to invest, and helped industry to develop Japan's infrastructure.

8 'The outcomes of decolonisation were almost invariably disastrous'. How far do you agree?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that:

- many countries were left impoverished when European countries, which had imposed control over them and exploited them, withdrew
- many new countries had not been prepared for independence; their frontiers were often artificial ones imposed by Europeans; tribal differences led to Civil Wars (e.g. Nigeria and the Congo); when the British withdrew from Nyasaland (Malawi), they left few schools and no industry; when the Portuguese left Mozambique, they deliberately destroyed industry
- European countries retained control over many new states, which continued to rely on the markets and investments which Europe could provide
- many new states were easy prey for multi-national companies
- new governments were often run by local political elite groups and often had no incentive to improve the conditions of ordinary people; corruption was often rife; where new governments were prepared to reform (e.g. nationalising resources), or where governments showed signs of being pro-communist, western countries disapproved and cut off aid to de-stabilise the government (e.g. Indo-China, East Timor, Chad, Angola, Mozambique, Zaire, Jamaica)
- many new states were economically under-developed and often relied on the export of one or two commodities, which left them open to fluctuations in world demand or the effects of adverse weather
- loans from abroad left many new countries heavily in debt
- many new states suffered from famine / drought

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that some of the newly independent countries did do well. Many of these were former British colonies, which inherited British systems of law and order, liberal capitalism and parliamentary democracy.