MARK SCHEME for the October/November 2007 question paper

9697 HISTORY

9697/02   Paper 2, maximum raw mark 100

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began.

All Examiners are instructed that alternative correct answers and unexpected approaches in candidates' scripts must be given marks that fairly reflect the relevant knowledge and skills demonstrated.

Mark schemes must be read in conjunction with the question papers and the report on the examination.

CIE is publishing the mark schemes for the October/November 2007 question papers for most IGCSE, GCE Advanced Level and Advanced Subsidiary Level syllabuses and some Ordinary Level syllabuses.

UNIVERSITY *of* CAMBRIDGE
International Examinations

NOTE: All questions are to be marked using the generic marking bands for source-based and essay questions.

SECTION A

Source based question: PROGRESS FROM PARTIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT TO FULL GOVERNMENT, 1955–1959: THE 1957 CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS.

How far do Sources A–E support the view that Britain's concerns over the threat to law and order in Singapore were exaggerated?

L1.   WRITES ABOUT THE HYPOTHESIS, NO VALID USE OF SOURCES.   [1–5]

These answers will ignore the question, i.e. they will not use the sources as information/evidence to test the given hypothesis. Include in this level answers which give information taken from the sources, but only producing an account of events rather than exploring the hypothesis.

L2.   USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM THE SOURCES TO CHALLENGE **OR** SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS.   [6–8]

These answers use the sources as information rather than evidence, i.e. sources are used at face value only with no evaluation/interpretation of context. Lower band answers will only partially answer the question.

L3.   USES INFORMATION FROM SOURCES TO CHALLENGE **AND** SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS.   [9–13]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves both attempting to confirm or to challenge it. However, sources are still used only at face value.

L4.   BY INTERPRETING/EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE **OR** SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS.   [14-16]

These answers are capable of using sources as evidence, i.e. demonstrating their utility in testing the hypothesis by interpreting them in historical context rather than simply accepting them at face value (as in L3)

L5.   BY INTERPRETING/EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE **AND** SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS.   [17-21]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves attempting both to confirm and challenge the hypothesis, and are capable of using sources as evidence to do this (i.e. both confirmation and challenge are done at this level).

L6.   AS L5 PLUS **EITHER** (a) EXPLAINS WHY EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE/SUPPORT IS BETTER/PREFERRED, **OR** (b) RECONCILES/EXPLAINS PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT NEITHER CHALLENGE NOR SUPPORT IS TO BE PREFERRED.   [22–25]

For (a) this builds upon L4 and L5, but the argument must be that the evidence for challenging/supporting is better/preferred. This must involve a comparative judgment, i.e. not just why some evidence is better, but why other evidence is worse.

For (b) include all L5 answers whilst using the evidence to present a nuanced response which may modify the hypothesis (rather than simply seeking to support/contradict) in order to improve it.

For the highest level in both (a) and (b), the conclusion should be based on an overall assessment of the different opinions/perceptions shown in the sources or by establishing different criteria for support/contradiction.

SECTION B

2. **Assess the extent to which Western powers achieved political control over Southeast Asia in the period 1870 to 1914.**

Dutch rule in East Indies was dominated by Dutch economic interests, which largely precluded moving towards any social theory of colonialism. This in turn meant that the Dutch were not interested in establishing a formal political regime and preferred to use indirect rule which forestalled any political unrest and resultant disruption to economic activity. However, the Dutch did impose many institutional changes which suggest political control, not least the imposition of a Dutch language educational system.

Strong candidates may question the extent to which political control was the aim of the Western powers. They may state that the principle aim was economic, and thus political control was only pursued when economic interests exploitation could not take place without it.

However, the French idea of a 'civilising mission' in Indochina (following the Jules Ferry Doctrine of 1885) indicated a strong primary desire to establish political control with economic exploitation as a secondary consequence. In Indochina, the French republic emphasised the necessity of indigenous 'assimilation' into the French model of society – and therefore sought political control. One significant example of this was the building of an educational system based upon the French model.

Counter example 1: Siam avoided many of the worst problems brought on by imperial powers by undergoing its own economic modernisation. This meant that existing indigenous governmental and social authority remained largely in tact alongside modern developments avoiding political control.

Counter example 2: From 1898 Americans pursued a policy of liberating the Philippines politically, whilst maintaining strong economic control. However, initial American intervention in the Philippines was the result of events pertaining to the Cuban war, rather than direct a political desire to pursue colonial policy. Very strong candidates might highlight how this example challenges the idea that the desire to establish formal political control was 'Western', and state that colonialism was 'European'.

3. **How successfully did the rural populations of societies in Southeast Asia respond to the economic opportunities and challenges of capitalism between 1900 and 1941?**

In the pre-colonial period, the village had been the basis for the economic system with local agricultural production as the key economic activity. The initial appearance of formal currency led to a greater degree of exchange above the village level, and allowed rural populations access to a greater variety of material possessions. However, with the greater penetration of capital, the village society was critically undermined, and rural populations adapted poorly to the new economic circumstances. The peasantry were caught up in a system in which they were the lowest level, and so most subjected to its forces. In the face of the system, rural populations borrowed heavily from money-lenders and sank into severe debt. The impact of the Great Depression accentuated this debt, which in the end could only be sold by the selling of land. The countryside therefore quickly moved from a system of small-holdings to tenant farming. By 1939 for example, 59 percent of cultivated land in Lower Burma was in the hands of non-producing land-owners and farmed by tenant farmers. Such a process also occurred in Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines. In the Philippines, this was further accelerated by the opening of new markets with the United States, so that land under went a crop revolution with ever greater intensity of single crop production, especially sugar. The intensity of change was lessened in independent Siam, where government intervention prevented the worst effects of rural transformation. The effects of these changes for the rural population were a steadily declining standard of living and, in Vietnam in particular, a greater

exploitation of the indigenous population by the colonial regime. The Dutch in Indonesia, under the banner of 'compassionate colonialism' eventually responded to these hardships, offering local populations economic support and welfare programs. However, across Southeast Asia measures put in place by colonial regimes did little to alienate rural hardship.

4. **How significant was the growth of cities to the economy and politics of Southeast Asia before 1941?**

This question requires candidates to look at both economic and political factors and in particular to look at actual cities as examples rather than whole countries. Candidates should look at the development of economies by the improved infrastructure of cities, growth of banking and financial services, improved transport and also access to markets. Politically cities were more active and less easy to control or police. Cities were the centres of government and also of the bureaucracy.

5. **To what extent was nationalism in Southeast Asia up to 1941 based upon traditional ideas?**

In Indonesia, Islam was one of three sources of nationalist sentiment up to 1941. Sukarno argued for unity of traditional and modern ideas, the goals of Islamic, Marxist, and nationalist causes towards the goal of independence – with Islam and Marxism both subordinate to nationalist goals. However, those in the Islamic party felt that Sukarno was too secular. In the Philippines, democratic institutions were put in place by the Americans with a view to Philippine independence. These offset anti-colonial 'nationalism', whilst creating the basis of a sense of nationhood under the democratic process. In Indochina, suppression of the nationalist by the French authorities left the Nationalist cause in the hands of the communists. Although seemingly a modern ideology, communism attracted significant peasant support as it encouraged a link between communist ideas and Confucianism. In Malaya, it was traditional structures of authority which prevented the rise of nationalism. The British ruled through local Malay rulers, so that populations did not mobilise against the British as an alien force. Political sentiment was still therefore expressed within traditional structures of governance. In Siam the state remained independent not through traditional means but through modernisation. The coup d'etat in 1932 abolished absolute monarchy but did not eliminate conservatism. The movement from an absolute monarchy to constitutional form of government in a period of economic modernisation mirror the growth of western nationalism during the nineteenth century, rather than Asian nationalism in the twentieth century. In Burma, nationalism had grown through the Young Men's Buddist Association and was therefore primarily concerned with religious questions. In the early 1920s though it transformed its program into that of a more wide-ranging Nationalist movement. During the 1930s though, new nationalist forces emerged with more sympathy to modern communism. This was led by a younger generation of university students, and so Nationalism was split between an older generation whose origins lay within traditional ideas, and a new progressive movement influenced by new ideas. It was though the older generation who by 1937 had achieved the most significant successes, with a new constitution and greater internal political control.

6. **Assess the reasons why the Second World War was the turning point for nationalist movements in Southeast Asia. (You must not use examples drawn from Singapore to support your answer.)**

Knowledge: Candidates must demonstrate an understanding of the character of anti- imperial movements before, during, and immediately after the Second World War, and assimilate those changes in the light of the events of the war,

Issues: candidates should test the hypothesis that the Second World War was a key event in ending imperialism.

The imperial powers enjoyed relatively solid control of Southeast Asian colonies in the prewar period.

Prewar: Some of the ground was laid for the nationalist movements in the prewar period though. Nationalism had been developing since the late nineteenth century. In Indochina, the French education system exposed some, Like Ho, to new ideas such as Communism, not least during his period of university education in Paris.

During the War and Japanese Occupation: The growth of military and other forms of resistance by Malayan Chinese and the Vietminh. Nationalists developed from political opposition to a military struggle and were offered material support from the allies. The residue of this struggle was easy access to weapons into the postwar period.

Immediate postwar period: The rise of new powers, especially America, meant that new diplomatic forces promoted decolonisation in the late 1940s. This is particularly relevant to the Dutch, whose attempts to re-establish control of Indonesia were forestalled by American diplomatic pressure. However, there was entrenchment. The French saw re-entry into Indochina as a prerequisite to re-establishing their position as a global power. From late 1944, the French intended to re-conquer Indochina in order to join the allies in the War in Asia. When the war ended, they promoted their Indochina policy as a force for stability in Southeast Asia. With the onset of the Cold War, the French received economic and material support from the United States in their war against the Vietminh. Burma was granted independence as the British shifted their colonial focus from South Asia to Africa.

7. **How much were ethnic minorities allowed to participate in the politics of the newly-independent states of Southeast Asia?**

In Indonesia, attempts at any form of national participation in the political process were made difficult by the numerous ethnic divisions. Initially, Sukarno promoted mass participation. By 1955 though, when the elections demonstrated how split Indonesian society was, Sukarno declared his leadership one which would avoid inter-island rivalry and forestall possible civil war. His policy of 'guided democracy' sought in particular to prevent the domination of Javenese communists. Yet others also expressed that fear, and military and senior civil service officials on Sumatra openly rebelled in late 1956. The rebellion was eventually put down, but it meant that Sukarno further centralized power at the center. In the most distant region, Aceh, provincial elites were allowed a degree of autonomy by the centre, and used that autonomy to further their own ends either through seeking alliances with the centre, or threatening to oppose it when their interests were not being met. In Malaya, the British had been viewed by the population as a means of preventing the influence of the ethnic Chinese. From independence, the central focus of politics has been intra-communal suspicions and fear. The idea of 'Malayanisation', by which democracy is secured through the greater prosperity of the indigenous Malay than that of the Chinese is the starkest example. Malay political elites argued that power could only be distributed amongst the whole population, including Indians and Chinese, once the interests of the Malays had been secured, and non-Malaya had proved their political loyalty to the state. This also led to problems in the formation of Greater Malaysia, with Singapore succeeding from the union because of the inability of Malay politicians and ethnic Chinese leaders in Singapore to establish a working relationship. However, Singapore itself has been very successful in offsetting any potential ethnic conflicts. Never an ethnically Chinese state, Singapore adopted four official languages, Malay, Mandarin, Tamil and English, and has promoted the idea of 'unity in diversity.' In Burma, minority populations such as the Karens and the Shans have openly challenged the government. In addition, refugees from Communist China caused further political tensions after 1949.

8. **How successful were attempts at regional co-operation between the newly-independent states of Southeast Asia between 1960 and 1980?**

In the 1960s, there was a great deal of mutual distrust between the newly-independent states of Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian economic activity remained an export economy to the wider world. In 1970, only 6 percent of trade in Southeast Asia was carried out between Asian states. In 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was established. The avowed goal of this re-organisation was to promote economic activity. However, it soon became clear that ASEAN fulfilled other roles, especially in terms of political co-operation. This political co-operation did though build confidence between former rivals and economic activity developed on that basis during the 1970s. Initially, ASEAN economic activity was characterised by bi-lateral trade agreements between members. This meant that trade developed between the ASEAN nations so that intra-ASEAN trade rose from 4 percent of total trade of all ASEAN members to between 12–15 percent by 1980. This had been further facilitated in 1977 by the signing of the Preferential Trading Arrangement by which ASEAN states agreed to allow preferential tariff rates between members. The United Nations also assisted ASEAN during the 1970s by conducting an independent study into ASEAN economic co-operation, and assisting the ASEAN states with the implementation of its proposals.