



General Certificate in Education

A2 History 6041

Alternative F Unit 4

Mark Scheme

2008 examination – June series

Mark schemes are prepared by the Principal Examiner and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation meeting attended by all examiners and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation meeting ensures that the mark scheme covers the candidates' responses to questions and that every examiner understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for the standardisation meeting each examiner analyses a number of candidates' scripts: alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed at the meeting and legislated for. If, after this meeting, examiners encounter unusual answers which have not been discussed at the meeting they are required to refer these to the Principal Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of candidates' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

Further copies of this Mark Scheme are available to download from the AQA Website: www.aqa.org.uk

Copyright © 2008 AQA and its licensors. All rights reserved.

COPYRIGHT

AQA retains the copyright on all its publications. However, registered centres for AQA are permitted to copy material from this booklet for their own internal use, with the following important exception: AQA cannot give permission to centres to photocopy any material that is acknowledged to a third party even for internal use within the centre.

Set and published by the Assessment and Qualifications Alliance.

CRITERIA FOR MARKING GCE HISTORY:

A2 EXAMINATION PAPERS

General Guidance for Examiners

A: INTRODUCTION

The AQA's A2 History specification has been designed to be 'objectives-led' in that questions are set which address the assessment objectives published in the Board's specification. These cover the normal range of skills, knowledge and understanding which have been addressed by A2 level candidates for a number of years.

Most questions will address more than one objective reflecting the fact that, at A2 level, high-level historical skills, including knowledge and understanding, are usually deployed together.

The specification has addressed subject content through the identification of 'key questions' which focus on important historical issues. These 'key questions' give emphasis to the view that GCE History is concerned with the analysis of historical problems and issues, the study of which encourages candidates to make judgements grounded in evidence and information.

The schemes of marking for the specification reflect these underlying principles. The mark scheme which follows is of the 'levels of response' type showing that candidates are expected to demonstrate their mastery of historical skills in the context of their knowledge and understanding of History.

Consistency of marking is of the essence in all public examinations. This factor is particularly important in a subject like History which offers a wide choice of subject content options or alternatives within the specification for A2.

It is therefore of vital importance that assistant examiners apply the marking scheme as directed by the Principal Examiner in order to facilitate comparability with the marking of other alternatives.

Before scrutinising and applying the detail of the specific mark scheme which follows, assistant examiners are required to familiarise themselves with the instructions and guidance on the general principles to apply in determining into which level of response an answer should fall (Section B) and in deciding on a mark within a particular level of response (Section C).

B: EXEMPLIFICATION OF A LEVEL (A2) DESCRIPTORS

The relationship between the Assessment Objectives (AOs) 1.1, 1.2 and 2 and the Levels of Response.

A study of the generic levels of response mark scheme will show that candidates, who operate solely or predominantly in AO 1.1, by writing a narrative or descriptive response, will restrict themselves to a maximum of 6 out of 20 marks by performing at Level 1. Those candidates going on to provide more explanation (AO 1.2), supported by the relevant selection of material (AO1.1), will have access to approximately 6 more marks, performing at Level 2 and low Level 3, depending on how implicit or partial their judgements prove to be. Candidates providing explanation with evaluation and judgement, supported by the selection of appropriate information and exemplification, will clearly be operating in all 3 AOs (AO 2, AO1.2 and AO1.1) and will therefore have access to the highest levels and the full range of 20 marks by performing in Levels 3, 4 and 5.

Level 1:***Either***

Is able to demonstrate, by relevant selection of material, implicit understanding of the question. Answers will be predominantly, or wholly narrative.

Or

Answer implies analysis but is excessively generalised, being largely or wholly devoid of specific information. Such answers will amount to little more than assertion, involving generalisations which could apply to almost any time and/or place.

Exemplification/guidance

Narrative responses will have the following characteristic: they

- will lack direction and any clear links to the analytical demands of the question
- will, therefore, offer a relevant but outline-only description in response to the question
- will be limited in terms of communication skills, organisation and grammatical accuracy.

Assertive responses: at this level, such responses will:

- lack any significant corroboration
- be generalised and poorly focused
- demonstrate limited appreciation of specific content
- be limited in terms of communication skills, organisation and grammatical accuracy.

IT IS MOST IMPORTANT TO DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN THIS TYPE OF RESPONSE AND THOSE WHICH ARE SUCCINCT AND UNDEVELOPED BUT FOCUSED AND VALID (appropriate for Level 2 or above).

Level 2:***Either***

Demonstrates, by relevant selection of material, some understanding of a range of relevant issues. Most such answers will show understanding of the analytical demands but lack weight and balance.

Or

Demonstrates, by relevant selection of material, implicit understanding of a wide range of relevant issues. Most such answers will be dependent on descriptions, but will have valid links.

Exemplification/guidance

Narrative responses will have the following characteristics:

- understanding of some but not all of the issues
- some direction and focus demonstrated largely through introductions or conclusions
- some irrelevance and inaccuracy
- coverage of all parts of the question but be lacking in balance
- some effective use of the language, be coherent in structure, but limited grammatically.

Analytical responses will have the following characteristics:

- arguments which have some focus and relevance
- an awareness of the specific context
- some accurate but limited factual support
- coverage of all parts of the question but be lacking in balance
- some effective use of language, be coherent in structure, but limited grammatically.

Level 3:

Demonstrates by selection of appropriate material, explicit understanding of a range of issues relevant to the question. Judgement, as demanded by the question, may be implicit or partial.

Exemplification/guidance

Level 3 responses will be characterised by the following:

- the approach will be generally analytical but may include some narrative passages which will be limited and controlled
- analysis will be focused and substantiated, although a complete balance of treatment of issues is not to be expected at this level nor is full supporting material
- there will be a consistent argument which may, however, be incompletely developed, not fully convincing or which may occasionally digress into narrative
- there will be relevant supporting material, although not necessarily comprehensive, which might include reference to interpretations
- effective use of language, appropriate historical terminology and coherence of style.

Level 4:

Demonstrates by selection of a wide range of precisely selected material, explicit understanding of the demands of the question and provides a consistently analytical response to it. Judgement, as demanded by the question, will be explicit but may be limited in scope.

Exemplification/guidance

Answers at this level have the following characteristics:

- sustained analysis, explicitly supported by relevant and accurate evidence
- little or no narrative, usually in the form of exemplification
- coverage of all the major issues, although there may not be balance of treatment
- an attempt to offer judgement, but this may be partial and in the form of a conclusion or summary
- effective skills of communication through the use of accurate, fluent and well directed prose.

Level 5:

As Level 4 but also shows appropriate conceptual awareness which, together with the selection of a wide range of precisely selected evidence, offers independent and effectively sustained judgement appropriate to the full demands of the question.

Exemplification/guidance

Level 5 will be differentiated from Level 4 in that there will be:

- a consistently analytical approach
- consistent corroboration by reference to selected evidence
- a clear and consistent attempt to reach judgements
- some evidence of independence of thought, but not necessarily of originality
- a good conceptual understanding
- strong and effective communication skills, grammatically accurate and demonstrating coherence and clarity of thought.

C: DECIDING ON MARKS WITHIN A LEVEL

These principles are applicable to both the Advanced Subsidiary examination and to the A level (A2) examination.

Good examining is, ultimately, about the **consistent application of judgement**. Mark schemes provide the necessary framework for exercising that judgement but it cannot cover all eventualities. This is especially so in subjects like History, which in part rely upon different interpretations and different emphases given to the same content. One of the main difficulties confronting examiners is: "What precise mark should I give to a response *within* a level?". Levels may cover four, five or even six marks. From a maximum of 20, this is a large proportion. In making a decision about a specific mark to award, it is vitally important to think *first* of the mid-range within the level, where the level covers more than two marks. Comparison with other candidates' responses **to the same question** might then suggest that such an award would be unduly generous or severe.

In making a decision away from the middle of the level, examiners should ask themselves several questions relating to candidate attainment, **including the quality of written communication skills**. The more positive the answer, the higher should be the mark awarded. We want to avoid "bunching" of marks. Levels mark schemes can produce regression to the mean, which should be avoided.

So, is the response:

- precise in its use of factual information?
- appropriately detailed?
- factually accurate?
- appropriately balanced, or markedly better in some areas than in others?
- and, **with regard to the quality of written communication skills:**
 - generally coherent in expression and cogent in development (as appropriate to the level awarded by organising relevant information clearly and coherently, using specialist vocabulary and terminology)?
- well-presented as to general quality of language, i.e. use of syntax (including accuracy in spelling, punctuation and grammar)? (In operating this criterion, however, it is important to avoid "double jeopardy". Going to the bottom of the mark range for a level in each part of a structured question might well result in too harsh a judgement. The overall aim is to mark positively, giving credit for what candidates know, understand and can do, rather than looking for reasons to reduce marks.)

It is very important that Assistant Examiners **do not** always start at the lowest mark within the level and look for reasons to increase the level of reward from the lowest point. This will depress marks for the alternative in question and will cause problems of comparability with other question papers within the same specification.

June 2008

Alternative F: Russia and the USSR, 1855–1991

A2 Unit 4: Russia and the USSR, 1881–1985

Question 1

(a) Use **Sources B** and **C** and your own knowledge.

How fully does **Source C** support the view put forward in **Source B** of the Soviet regime's approach to creating a socialist economy in the years to 1941? (10 marks)

Target: AO1.1, AO1.2, AO2

- | | | |
|-----|---|-------------|
| L1: | Identifies/extracts simple statements from the sources which demonstrate agreement/disagreement on the issue. | 1-2 |
| L2: | Demonstrates explicit understanding of utility/sufficiency etc. with reference to the sources and knowledge of the issue. | 3-5 |
| L3: | Draws conclusions about utility/sufficiency in relation to the issue, with reference to both sources and to own knowledge. | 6-8 |
| L4: | Uses material selected appropriately from both source and own knowledge to reach a sustained judgement on utility/sufficiency in relation to the issue. | 9-10 |

Indicative content

Source B helps to explain the organisation and progress of the Soviet economy during the NEP years. However, it only partly explains the context: the fact that the economy recovered between 1921 and 1926 is not really explained in this extract. Own knowledge should tell candidates that this recovery was as much due to the fact that the disruption of Civil War ended in 1921, and the fact that the regime could now devote more effort to the economy, as to any measures implemented by the Bolsheviks themselves. Lenin's NEP certainly did lead to an increase in production, because small scale private enterprise was encouraged and peasants were encouraged to produce for the market. The source does briefly mention the contribution of small industry. The source makes no mention of agriculture, but then Communists regarded socialism as being all about industrialisation. The source does give reasons for the fact that even in 1926; production did not meet 1913 levels, mentioning inefficient management, outdated technology and a poorly motivated labour force, without explaining these in any depth. The criticisms of large scale industry made in the source help to explain, by implication, why Communists were committed to ending NEP and industrialising Russia – the arguments between Left and Right were not about the principle of industrialisation, simply the way it should be implemented, an argument which Stalin won in 1928. The source does not explain why Lenin's NEP treated heavy and light industry differently, although candidates should know that heavy industry was left in state hands because it was crucial to future success and 'socialisation' was key tenet of Communist philosophy.

Source C is possibly more directly helpful in explaining that the USSR 'missed out' the bourgeois stage of evolution without clearly explaining the reasons. Candidates should realise that Communists adopted this approach for various reasons – among them the fact that without

accepting that 'socialists rather than capitalists' should industrialise, it would have been impossible to credibly justify the Bolshevik coup in 1917, rather than the Bolsheviks waiting for capitalist economic development to take place naturally first, as Marx anticipated. The source is more helpful in directly explaining the Soviet obsession with defence, however expensive to the economy: it was necessary to industrialise in order to protect the revolution and defeat the much publicised capitalist enemy. The source is helpful in outlining the key features of Stalin's approach – the emphasis on coercion and 'command' – although it gives no detail of what this meant in practice.

Therefore both sources partly explain the Soviet approach to socialism, although they refer to different periods, one the 1920s, one the 1930s and Source C *partly* supports Source B.

(b) Use **Sources A, B, C** and **D** and your own knowledge.

'Russian and Soviet Governments were remarkably successful in achieving their goal of industrial modernisation in the years 1881 to 1985.'

Assess the validity of this view.

(20 marks)

Target: AO1.1, AO1.2, AO2

L1: Is able to demonstrate, by relevant selection of material, *either* from appropriate sources *or* from own knowledge, implicit understanding of the question. Answers will be predominantly, or wholly, narrative. **1-6**

L2: ***Either***

Demonstrates, by relevant selection of material, *either* from the sources *or* from own knowledge, some understanding of a range of relevant issues. Most such answers will show understanding of the analytical demands, but will lack weight and balance.

Or

Demonstrates, by relevant selection of material, *both* from the sources *and* from own knowledge, implicit understanding of a wide range of relevant issues. These answers, while relevant, will lack both range and depth and will contain some assertion. **7-11**

L3: Is able to demonstrate, by relevant selection of material, *both* from the sources *and* from own knowledge, explicit understanding of the issues relevant to the question. Judgement, as demanded by the question, may be implicit or partial. **12-15**

L4: Demonstrates, by selection of a wide range of precisely selected material, *both* from the sources *and* from own knowledge, explicit understanding of the demands of the question and provides a consistently analytical response to it. Judgement, as demanded by the question, will be explicit but may be limited in scope. **16-18**

L5: As L4, but also shows appropriate conceptual awareness which, together with the selection of a wide range of precisely selected evidence, offers independent and effectively sustained judgement appropriate to the full demands of the question. **19-20**

Indicative content

Source A suggests that prior to 1914; the goal of industrial modernisation was only partially met: expansion was rapid, but industry was backward, inefficient, and labour-intensive. The record of small enterprises was more mixed, but it is not clear whether their relative 'vigour' was due to

modernisation or lack of it. Foreign capital was important, but it is not made clear whether it was used to specifically 'modernise'. Source B clearly suggests a failure in modernisation: there are specific references to backwards management, outdated technology and intensive labour. There are detailed explanations of inefficiency and the Communists' failure to address this in any meaningful way. Source C refers to a drive for industrialisation, without suggesting whether or not this can be equated with modernisation, although the reference to military production implies that this did not help the cause of other industries. Source D clearly suggests that modernisation failed: there are references to backwardness, poor quality, wasteful production, and a clear statement that the country's 'well-being' was not helped.

Therefore overall the sources, whilst showing some evidence of industrial progress, also suggests several deficiencies and failures, and do not present a case for 'remarkable success'.

Own knowledge is likely to confirm that industrial modernisation was not 'remarkably' successful. Modernisation was attempted in the late nineteenth century, particularly under Witte, and was initially heavily dependent on foreign investment. Railway building was a significant feature of this. There was industrial development in some cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, although industry was very labour intensive rather than innovative, and the economy overall was still very rural-based. Buying in foreign expertise was expensive, and the work force was often poorly trained. There was progress in the early twentieth century, as the economy became less dependent on foreign investment, but there were also periods of boom and recession. During the First World War, not all industry was backward, but the strain of war and the focus on military production was not conducive to modernisation, and disruption continued after 1917. Factories, without experienced managers, were often not productive.

Russian industry was in a bad way by 1921. Recovery under NEP was only partial: State-supported heavy industry had no particular incentive to modernise, and industry remained labour intensive.

Although Stalin's industrialisation was intended to modernise as well as socialise the USSR, and foreign expertise was brought in, the aim was only partially achieved. The criteria now were even more centred on quantity rather than quality. Any attempt to modernise could delay production, and it was more important to meet, or appear to meet quantitative targets than to worry about quality. Although educational opportunities were improved, efficiency and modernisation were not helped by the influx of untrained peasants into factories and poor working and living conditions. There were improvements in quality under the Second and Third Five Year Plans, but industry was still labour intensive and often inefficient despite big increases in production. The Second World War brought further dislocation and disruption, although the USSR was able to make some very effective armaments on a large scale.

Previous economic problems persisted after World War Two. Apart from the problems of reconstruction (which could have been the opportunity for more modernisation), there was the fact that the Stalinist economy operated largely as before, with the faults of the 1930s. Innovation was also discouraged by the fact that the USSR was able to plunder Eastern Europe and influenced East European economies to produce what it wanted, taking the pressure off itself to modernise. There were more innovative sectors, particularly in defence and the space race, because the Government devoted more energy, expertise and resources to them. Overall poor productivity and stagnation meant that Soviet industry stayed far behind the levels of more advanced economies, and occasional attempts to modernise usually failed or petered out – because nobody dared challenge the fundamentals of the Stalinist economy until the 1980s, when it was probably too late. Productivity levels actually fell. Managers did not know how to innovate or were afraid to, and had no experience of the pressures of a market economy. Although reform was discussed from the 1950s onwards, Khrushchev's preference was for

administrative reorganisation rather than industrial innovation. His creation of territorially-based councils to replace centralised branch ministries did not eliminate waste and duplication, and there was a return to Stalinist style ministerial controls after 1965. Kosygin's measures to give managers more independence and to take more account of costs and profits were defeated not least by bureaucratic opposition. An obsession with growth led to spectacular waste of resources and continued growth in the bureaucracy. Massive projects like the BAM railway were environmentally damaging and very inefficient. Industrial equipment was increasingly ageing and out of date, whilst the over-development of basic industrial sectors and the underdevelopment of others was never solved. Wasteful enterprises were subsidised rather than closed. Gorbachev recognised some of the problems, but he lacked the imagination, support or nerve to tackle the fundamentals of the problem until it was too late.

Level 1 answers are likely to be very generalised or descriptive. Level 2 answers will include relevant material, but are likely to be very descriptive of industrial developments, without really addressing the precise question of the degree of industrial modernisation. Level 3 answers will be relevant, although they may focus on industry per se without fully addressing issues of modernisation, and they may not be very balanced, for example not covering the whole period. Level 4 answers will be reasonably wide ranging and clearly focus on the question. Level 5 answers will also do this and additionally contain sustained judgement and possibly good perspective.

Section B

These questions are synoptic in nature and the rewarding of candidates' responses should be clearly linked to the range of factors or issues covered in the question as indicated by the generic A2 levels of response mark scheme and by the indicative content in the specific mark scheme for each question.

Standard Mark Scheme for Essays at A2 (*without* reference to sources).

Target: AO1.1, AO1.2, AO2

L1: ***Either***

Is able to demonstrate, by relevant selection of material, implicit understanding of the question. Answers will be predominantly or wholly narrative.

Or

Answer implies analysis, but is excessively generalised, being largely or wholly devoid of specific information. Such responses will amount to little more than assertion, involving generalisations which could apply almost to any time and/or place. **1-6**

L2: ***Either***

Demonstrates, by relevant selection of material, some understanding of a range of relevant issues. Most such answers will show understanding of the analytical demands, but will lack weight and balance.

Or

Demonstrates, by selection of appropriate material, implicit understanding of a range of relevant issues. Most such answers will be dependent on descriptions, but will have valid links. **7-11**

- L3: Demonstrates, by selection of appropriate material, explicit understanding of a range of issues relevant to the question. Judgement, as demanded by the question, may be implicit or partial. **12-15**
- L4: Demonstrates, by selection of a wide range of precisely selected material, explicit understanding of the demands of the question and provides a consistently analytical response to it. Judgement, as demanded by the question, will be explicit but may be limited in scope. **16-18**
- L5: As L4, but also shows appropriate conceptual awareness which, together with the selection of a wide range of precisely selected evidence, offers independent and effectively sustained judgement appropriate to the full demands of the question. **19-20**

Question 2

Assess the extent to which Stalin's motives for the collectivisation of agriculture in the USSR were political rather than economic. *(20 marks)*

Use standard mark scheme for essays at A2 (*without* reference to sources).

Marks as follows:

L1: 1-6 L2: 7-11 L3: 12-15 L4: 16-18 L5: 19-20

Indicative content

There were clearly both economic and political motives for collectivisation. Ideologically, an independent peasantry, itself divided into classes, was anathema to Communists, and seemed incompatible with the drive towards socialism which was at the heart of Communist policy. Even those on the Right, like Bukharin, who had been calling for encouragement of peasant prosperity had seen this as a tactical measure to create the wealth which would allow industrialisation to take place, not because they were inherently well-disposed towards peasants. Communism had been, and still was, an essentially urban phenomenon. Many Communists, including Stalin, felt that kulaks who prospered under NEP were powerful enough to hold the country to ransom, already seen when the disparity in agricultural and industrial prices had led to peasant reluctance to sell grain. Poor sales of grain by peasants in 1928 led to the forcible requisitioning of the 'Urals-Siberian' method. Signs of peasant resistance to this simply reinforced Stalin's hatred of the peasantry and fears that disturbances might spread to the army (still peasant-dominated) and food shortages, as peasants' hoarded grain. Therefore economic and political motives came together. Plans for rapid industrialisation depended upon secure supplies of cheap food and a massive pool of extra labour to work in the new industrial towns. The Soviets also wanted to sell grain abroad to pay for technical and manufactured imports.

Once the decision was taken to destroy the kulaks and collectivise, there was a vicious circle: peasant resistance simply created further fears of 'backstabbing' and unreliable kulaks, seen as class enemies of socialism, and therefore led to even more draconian measures, despite the temporary reprieve following Stalin's 'dizzy with success' speech. Some revisionist historians have also stressed that Stalin may have enjoyed a lot of popular support as well as Party support: many town dwellers saw collectivisation as a patriotic duty and resented competing with peasant migrants in the jobs market. Collectivisation also encouraged rifts and envy

between different classes of peasantry. Therefore collectivisation was not *just* imposed from above.

In the broader context, until the 1930s the regime had only partial control of the countryside. Communism was still largely urban-based, and the party had a limited presence in many areas of Russia, and the Revolution had had a limited impact. Collectivisation created the possibility of increasing the Party's hold in the countryside – it was much easier to control one large farm than a lot of disparate peasants (it is no coincidence that following collectivisation, there was no further mass revolt against Soviet control until the USSR broke up). Therefore economic and political/ideological motives were closely intertwined, and any well-argued answer which analyses the relative importance of motives should be credited.

Level 1 answers will be very generalised. Level 2 answers will contain relevant material, but are likely to be very descriptive or narrative-based, e.g. focusing on the process of collectivisation rather than the motives, and may deal with political *or* economic motives only. Level 3 answers will certainly attempt to answer the question of relative importance, and there will be evidence of both analysis and knowledge, although the answer may not be well-balanced. Level 4 answers will focus on motives, and give due weight to both economic and political motives and their relative importance. Level 5 answers will also do this, but will additionally contain sustained and well-supported judgement.

Question 3

To what extent, by 1953, had the USSR recovered economically and socially from the impact of the 1941–1945 War? (20 marks)

Use standard mark scheme for essays at A2 (*without* reference to sources).

Marks as follows:

L1: 1-6 L2: 7-11 L3: 12-15 L4: 16-18 L5: 19-20

Indicative content

The war was catastrophic for the USSR in several respects: the enormous loss of life, the destruction of farmland, industry, towns and villages, the financial costs, the emotional scars and so on. Recovery was bound to be slow and painful, despite victory.

The social costs were so enormous that the USSR had scarcely begun to recover by 1953. Every family had been affected by the war. During the war itself, there had been a steep decline in marriages and births. Despite government measures in 1944 and 1948 to address demographic issues – making divorce more difficult, giving allowances and awards to larger families and taxing smaller families more heavily – the population was slow to recover, especially since there was a large surplus of women over men. Many of those who had fled or been evacuated during the war found it difficult to return. The lives of peasants became harder, especially as more and more farmwork had to be done by women, and often old women, there were shortages of machinery (80% of collective farm workers were women by 1945). The number of workers in industry also fell, and very importantly, so did the level of skill and experience. The proportion of women in industry also rose.

Socially, many dreams were smashed – the desperate hopes for a better life and liberalisation after the horrors of war were never realised. Stalin was as repressive as before, even if the purges were not on the same scale. Xenophobia led to Russia being even more cut off from the world than before. Hopes of an end to collectivisation were dashed. The standard of living fell, although the bureaucratic class in towns did considerably better than the mass of the population. National groups, several of whom had been treated brutally by a suspicious regime during the War, certainly never recovered by 1953.

The economy had been devastated by war. 25% of capital stock had been destroyed by 1945 (up to 66% in occupied areas). Nevertheless, in some respects post-war recovery was remarkable, boosted by the plundering of occupied territories in central Europe, and reparations. The labour of enemy prisoners was ruthlessly exploited. Over 2.5 million people were re-housed within 9 months of the war. The Fourth Five Year Plan was launched in 1946, plus a longer term 15 Year strategic plan. Industrial production considerably exceeded pre-war levels (agricultural production slightly exceeded 1940 levels). Investment in fixed capital in 1950 was 70% higher than in 1940, and targets were exceeded. There was renewed work on construction and defence, and some elements of heavy industry made remarkable progress, reaching pre-war levels and exceeding targets before Stalin's death. Consumer goods were given a lower priority but still exceeded the 1940 level by 250% and increased rapidly after 1950. Most economic progress was made in armaments, machine building and steel. Real wages increased considerably after 1947. However, there were also drawbacks. Some of the concessions such as larger private plots were reversed. There was a drought in 1946 and poor harvests and livestock figures in 1953 were below those of 1928. The Stalinist command economy with all its bureaucracy and inefficiencies was still in place. Resources were still diverted from consumption into investment. Living standards in 1950 were similar to 1928, although industrial production had increased.

Level 1 answers will be very generalised. Level 2 answers will have some relevant knowledge, but may be very descriptive or narrative-based, and may focus only on *one* of social or economic aspects. Level 3 answers will address both, although possibly not in a balanced way, and they will be relevant with some analysis, although lacking depth. Level 4 answers will show a good combination of knowledge and relevant analysis, without necessarily covering all aspects. Level 5 answers will contain sustained and well-supported judgement, placing the 1945–1953 period clearly in the context of what had happened before 1945.

Question 4

Assess the extent to which the motives for Destalinisation in the USSR between the death of Stalin in 1953 and the fall of Khrushchev in 1964 were political rather than economic. (20 marks)

Use standard mark scheme for essays at A2 (*without* reference to sources).

Marks as follows:

L1: 1-6 L2: 7-11 L3: 12-15 L4: 16-18 L5: 19-20

Indicative content

There had been very limited reform even before Stalin's death, e.g. Khrushchev (made Politburo spokesman for agriculture in 1949) had amalgamated some less efficient collective farms with more prosperous ones. There was also discussion of the need to revitalise the Party. After Stalin's death there was recognition of the need for some political and economic change. The need for 'socialist legality' was emphasised, i.e. the rule of law and an end to arbitrary arrest. There were also warnings to avoid a cult of personality, a very cautious dig at Stalin's rule. Malenkov championed more consumer goods, lower prices, and relaxation of rigid ideological controls. Yet the most radical reformer, Beria, was executed, because he was seen as a political threat given his control of the MVD.

The economic motives for Destalinisation were fairly obvious. The Stalinist command economy had achieved great feats and helped the USSR win the war, but it clearly suffered from great faults; it was inefficient, discouraged initiative, it neglected quality, it was imbalanced and unresponsive to popular needs. Agriculture was in a disastrous state, with low yields and an apathetic peasantry.

Economic problems were difficult to divorce from political considerations. Nobody had been prepared to challenge Stalin, and any criticism had been dangerous. A generation of Party bureaucrats had grown up either ideologically committed to 'Stalinism' or gaining too much power or privilege from the existing political and economic system to welcome change. Some of the competitors for power after Stalin, such as Khrushchev, recognised that if the USSR were to maintain its new position as a world power and compete with the West, it could not just rely on the old ways. In particular, the population needed to be more motivated and not just terrorised. Much of industry was backward and unable to supply agriculture or meet people's everyday needs. Khrushchev saw some decentralisation as a way of making industry and bureaucrats more responsive to need, but there was also a political motive, since various politicians were manoeuvring for power, and advocating reform was seen as a way of undermining opponents, particularly when they had their own enemies within the Party. So, for example, Khrushchev advocated reform partly as a means of countering the proposals of rivals like Malenkov and Beria. Khrushchev held no government office but was a member of the Central Committee, and therefore increased its role in making policy in order to increase his own influence. In foreign affairs (which candidates are not expected to study), Khrushchev was anxious to improve relations, e.g. with the Yugoslavs, and to develop the policy of peaceful coexistence.

Therefore although Beria started Destalinisation, Khrushchev gradually seized the initiative seen above all in the famous twentieth party congress. It is important to recognise that Destalinisation was always intended to be limited: there was no suggestion of dismantling the

whole Stalinist structure or lessening the role of the Party, only reforming it and making the USSR a slightly more humane, more efficient and more prosperous state, which would move forward to Communism. Clearly both political and economic motives were important, and any reasoned answer which argues the relative importance of the different aspects should be credited.

Level 1 answers will be very generalised. Level 2 answers will contain relevant material on Destalinisation, but are likely to be narrative-based or very descriptive of events before and during Khrushchev's time in power, and may focus only on economic or political motives. Level 3 answers will address the issue of both economic and political motives, and will address the question of relative importance, although answers may be unbalanced and somewhat limited in scope. Level 4 answers will contain a good blend of knowledge and relevant comparative analysis, although not all aspects will necessarily be covered. Level 5 answers will show confident use of knowledge and analysis will be reasonably wide-ranging and will contain well supported and sustained judgement.